

# **Islamophobia and anti-Semitism and their explanations.**

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## \* Abstract

Is Islamophobia a unique phenomenon or merely a particularisation of a general negative out-group attitude? To answer this question, we studied and compared attitudes towards Islam and Muslims with attitudes towards Judaism and Jews among more than 500 young people in the Netherlands. The findings support the notion of Islamophobia as a distinct construct and show that the other out-group attitude only partly contributes to the explanation of Islamophobia. Islam and Muslim specific cognitions, emotions, and direct contact and socialization experiences need to be included in the explanatory model if we want to understand the individual's development of Islamophobia.

## 1. Introduction

Is Islamophobia empirically a unique phenomenon or not fundamentally different from negative attitudes towards other out-groups? That is the intriguing question we want to answer in this paper.

Our inspiration to carry out the present analysis came when we received various questions about the uniqueness of Islamophobia in the review process of the first publications about our Islamophobia research (Van der Noll and Dekker, 2010; Dekker and Van der Noll, 2011) and when we noticed a growing discussion about this uniqueness of Islamophobia in various other publications (Stolz, 2005; Maher, Knox and DeCuzzi, 2008; Love, 2009; Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner 2009; Helbling 2010; and Farnen 2010).

The main proposition in this discussion is that Islamophobia has much more to do with a general negative attitude towards outgroups than with specific cognitions, emotions and experiences with respect to Islam and Muslims. In favor of the proposition is that many studies established strong associations between attitudes towards different national, ethnic, cultural out-groups (e.g., Echebarria-Echabe and Guede, 2007; Zick, Wolf, Küpper, Davidov, Schmidt, and Heitmeyer, 2008). Not in favor of the proposition is that research showed that different out-groups receive different levels of negative attitudes, stereotypes differ, and emotions evoked by the various out-groups are also different (Cottrell, Neuberg and Li 2007). Moreover, research generally showed that the attitude towards a specific out-group is only partly explained by the attitudes towards other out-groups. Finally, the common personality and value factors that are assumed to underlie the general negative out-group attitude – including authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, general religious intolerance, nationalism, conservatism and racism - generally contribute not or not much to the explanation of the attitudes towards the various out-groups. (Asbrock, Sibley and Duckitt, 2010; Duckitt and Sibley 2007).

One of the recently published studies that claim to support the proposition of a generalized negative attitude towards outgroups is Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner's 2009 study. These researchers expected that the predominant source of negative feelings about Muslims is 'part of a larger syndrome' and is 'a general sense of affect for and tolerance towards' other cultural, racial and ethnic minority groups (2009: 1). Their path analysis of 2004 NES data shows that 'cultural outgroup affect' – affect with respect to gays and lesbians, illegal immigrants, feminists, and people on welfare - had the largest direct impact of any variable on attitudes towards Muslims, and 'racial/religious minority

affect' – affect with respect to Jews, blacks, Asian-Americans, and Hispanics - the second largest direct effect. They concluded that their research findings provide strong support for their “bands of others” thesis’ (2009: 7). However, a few methodological remarks can be made. The attitude was measured by the relatively rough ‘feeling thermometer’. Employing relative measures of affects – the difference between the respondent’s rating of the particular group and the average rating that he or she gave to all of the groups – raises the question whether the dependent and independent variables are completely independent. The expectation that evaluations of Muslims are structured by authoritarianism and patriotism – two factors that, according to Kalkan et al., typically underly attitudes towards outgroups – was not supported by the data; authoritarianism nor patriotism had a direct effect on the attitudes towards Muslims. The independent variable ‘negative stereotypes’ in this study did not regard Muslims but non-Muslim African-, Asian- and Hispanic-Americans. Variables that have shown explanatory power in other studies – such as direct intergroup contact – were not included in the path analysis. Finally, the explained variance in attitude towards Muslims was low.

Very recently, Zick, Küpper and Hövermann (2011) published the results of their study of six different ‘prejudices’ - Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, racism, sexism, and homophobia - among 1.000 people in each of eight European countries. All correlations between these attitudes were strong including the correlations between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and xenophobia, and Islamophobia and racism. Supportive for the proposition is also that Islamophobia correlates with sexism and homophobia.<sup>1</sup> Also supportive is that the factor analysis of the six prejudices showed that a one factor model provides a good fit to the data and that the scale including all six prejudices had a strong internal reliability. This scale, called ‘group focused enmity’ (in the original German publication: ‘Gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit’) consists of ‘negative attitudes and prejudices against those groups which are designated as “different”, “strange”, or “abnormal” and to which a subordinate social status is assigned’ (Zick et al., 2011: 14). In the whole sample, almost four out of ten respondents more often agree than disagree with negative items about other people. Regression analyses showed that the main predictors are feeling of threat by immigrants, rejection of diversity, social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, religiosity, friendship perception, anomie, trust in other people, direct contact with immigrants, income, and fraternal relative deprivation. Their relative explanatory power is unknown because not one but several factor analyses were carried out, each including a selection of the independent variables. At the core is, according to the researchers, ‘an ideology of inequality’.

In this paper we test the proposition - Islamophobia is just an expression of a general negative attitude towards outgroups - and its assumptions by comparing Islamophobia with anti-Semitism. Islamophobia is on the rise in Europe and the USA and is also clearly

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<sup>1</sup> The correlations between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and xenophobia, and Islamophobia and racism were  $r = .37, .59$  and  $.28$ , respectively). The Dutch data showed a weaker correlation between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism but stronger correlations between Islamophobia and racism and between Islamophobia and xenophobia ( $.33, .35$  and  $.66$ , respectively). The latter finding is not very surprising because Muslim Turks and Maroccans are the largest non-European immigrant groups. The correlations between Islamophobia and sexism and homophobia are in the whole sample  $.29$  and  $.27$  and in the Netherlands:  $.40$  and  $.26$ , respectively. The Dutch respondents scored lowest on this ‘group-focused enmity’ scale.

present in various countries in Latin America and Asia (Pew Research Center 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011; Gündüz, 2010). Anti-Semitism is also once again on the rise throughout much of the world (Pew Research Center 2008, 2011; Cohen, Harber, Jussim and Bhasin, 2009). We asked ourselves the following questions: Are Islamophobia and anti-Semitism two different constructs? Are the levels of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism similar? Are the correlations between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism high? Does Islamophobia contribute to the explanation of anti-Semitism and does anti-Semitism partly explain the variance in Islamophobia? Are the origins of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism similar?

## **2. Islamophobia and anti-Semitism**

Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are viewed in our study as individual's attitudes. The major characteristic of an attitude is its affective nature; an attitude is 'the amount of affect for or against some object' (Fishbein & Ajzen 1975: 11). Following Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) we have opted for the one-dimensional interpretation of the attitude concept. In our view, cognitions (knowledge and perceptions, including clichés and stereotypes) and behaviour are not dimensions of an attitude, but rather variables that may explain variance in an attitude (cognitions), respectively be an effect of an attitude (behavior): more knowledge generally results in less stereotyping and reduction of negative out-group attitudes, while negative attitudes make negative behaviour towards out-groups more likely (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Perugini and Conner, 2000; Dekker, Dijkgraaf, and Meijerink, 2007; Van der Noll, 2010).<sup>2</sup>

We decided to include both the religion and its adherents in the definition and measurement of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism although the term Islamophobia primarily refers to the religion and anti-Semitism to the people. We see an indissoluble union between the attitude towards the religion and the attitude towards those who are perceived as its adherents. People like or dislike Muslims because they identify them with a religion that they like or dislike. Islamophobia is then having a negative attitude towards Islam and Muslims, while anti-Semitism is in our view having a negative attitude towards Judaism and Jews.

The term Islamophobia - used at least for a hundred years (López 2011) - has become a contested concept (Allen, 2010), a 'troubling term' (Shyroock, 2010: 4) and creates

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<sup>2</sup> In other publications, definitions and measures of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism (also) include individual's behavior. For example, 'anti-Semitism is operationally defined as prejudice, discrimination and/or hostility towards Judaism and/or Jewish people' (Simon and Schaler, 2007: 152) and 'Islamophobia is a rejection of Islam, Muslim groups and Muslim individuals on the basis of prejudice and stereotypes. It may have emotional, cognitive, evaluative as well as action-oriented elements ...' (Stolz, 2005: 548). Islamophobic acts are, for example, ignoring, verbal abuse, and discrimination of Muslims, (threats of) physical violence against Muslims, (threat of) desecration of mosques, openly support for policies that limit migration, restrict Muslims' civil liberties such as wearing a headscarf, demonstrating against the construction of mosques or minarets, opposing Turkey's EU membership and international cooperation with Muslim countries (World Economic Forum, 2008). Anti-Semitic acts include abusive language, hate mail, verbal insults at soccer matches, Holocaust denial, and (threat of) desecration of synagogues and cemeteries. In the Netherlands, the Center for Information and Documentation on Israel (CIDI) registered 334 antisemitic incidents from January 2003 to May 2004 in the Netherlands. Most antisemitic incidents were not violent. A considerable number of antisemitic offenders were of North-African origin (Simon and Schaler, 2007).

various misunderstandings (López, 2011). We use the term because other researchers, politicians and journalists do so and it has taken root in public discourses. One of the misunderstandings regards the ‘Islam’ part of the term. In our study the attitude regards both Islam and Muslims. The ‘phobia’ part is also misleading. It should be clear that ‘phobia’ does not signify a kind of mental illness here; a negative attitude towards Islam and Muslims may be ‘normal’ and based on rational considerations. It should also be clear that Islamophobia is not the equivalence of Islam criticism; a negative attitude towards Islam and Muslims is one thing but Islam can be scrutinized as a religion or ideology and Muslims can be examined as believers, acknowledging that ‘the’ Islam and ‘the Muslim’ do not exist while avoiding indiscriminate. Other terms in use may create other and sometimes more misunderstandings. For example, ‘anti-Muslim attitude’ (Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner, 2009; Savelkoul, Scheepers, Tolsma and Hagendoorn, 2010), ‘anti-Muslim sentiments’ (Hödl, 2010), ‘anti-Muslim prejudice’ (Malik, 2009), ‘global evaluations of Muslims’ (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 23), ‘Arabophobia’ (Djaït, 1978), ‘anti-Arab racism’ (Abraham 1994), and ‘anti-Arab prejudice’ (Echebarria-Echabe and Guede, 2007). ‘Anti-Muslim attitude’ and ‘anti-Muslim sentiments’ exclude the attitude towards Islam. ‘Arabophobia’, ‘Anti-Arab racism’, and ‘anti-Arab prejudice’ do not refer to Islam and Muslims and do not take into account that many, probably most Muslims live in non-Arab countries, while the category ‘Arab’ defies easy definition (Love, 2009). Islamophobia is a form of racism if it is believed that Islam cannot be removed from Muslims because it is in their blood and thus that Muslims can not stop being Muslims (Cigar, 2003). In the absence of this biological determinism and if it is believed that conversion or assimilation is a real possibility, Islamophobia is not (‘anti-Arab’) racism (Meer, 2008; Meer and Modood 2009).

The term anti-Semitism is also used at least for a hundred years, has also become a contested concept, and also creates misunderstandings (Meloan 1996; Frindte, Wammetsberger and Wettig, 2005a). Of great importance for the anti-Semitism research has been the work by Nevitt Sanford, later joined by Levinson, Frenkel-Brunswik and Adorno (Levinson and Sanford, 1944; Frenkel-Brunswik and Sanford, 1945; Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford, 1950, 1982). In their comprehensive five-year study ‘seven investigators used objective tests, interviews and projective techniques in demonstrating that personality processes, especially unconscious ones, had a major role in the determination of anti-Semitism and a broad pattern of related beliefs and attitudes – a pattern that came to be called authoritarianism’ (Sanford, 1984: 16). Nowadays, the distinction is made between ‘old’ and ‘new’ anti-Semitism (Frindte, Wammetsberger and Wettig, 2005b). Old anti-Semitism regards the attitude towards Jews and Judaism. New anti-Semitism also includes the attitude towards the state of Israel because it is a Jewish state. We have chosen for the ‘old’ anti-Semitism measurement because it is not always easy to separate anti-Zionism and criticisms of Israel’s domestic and foreign policies from negative attitudes towards Jews and Judaism. Generally more people are negative about Israel than about Jews and Judaism. In October 2003 large majorities in the Netherlands, Austria and Germany say that Israel ‘presents a threat to peace in the world’ (European Commission, Eurobarometer, 2003: 81). Social desirability and political correctness may be part of the explanation why the ‘old’ anti-Semitism data in European countries are lower than the ‘new’ anti-Semitism data including the attitudes towards Israel. A survey of 500 citizens in each of ten European countries showed that ‘the

prevalence of those harboring (self-reported) anti-Semitic views consistently increases with respondents' degree of ant-Israeli sentiment' but also that 'one certainly can be critical of Israeli policies without being anti-Semitic' (Kaplan and Small, 2006: 560).

### 3. Possible origins

To explain Islamophobia and anti-Semitism we derived the variables from theories that have been successful in explaining attitudes towards ethnic minorities in general. The social identity and integrated threat theories explain an induction of negative out-group attitudes. The intergroup contact theory explains a reduction of negative out-group attitudes. The socialisation theory can explain both reduction and induction, depending of the socialization contents.

Social identity theory argues that people have a fundamental need for a positive self-identity, and that this is to a large extent derived from social group membership (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1986; Abrams and Hogg, 1990). To maintain or enhance their self-esteem people compare the group they belong to with other groups and evaluate their own group positively, whereas they evaluate other groups less positively or even negatively. The national group is one of the main groups to identify with (Bloom, 1990). Two national attitudes have been empirically distinguished: patriotism and nationalism (Dekker, Malová and Hoogendoorn, 2003). Nationalism has more impact on negative out-group attitudes than patriotism (Coenders and Scheepers, 2004; Gijsberts, Hagendoorn and Scheepers, 2004; Hagendoorn and Poppe, 2004). Following the social identity theory we included *self-esteem* and the positive and very positive national in-group attitudes of *patriotism* and *nationalism* as independent variables in our analyses.

Integrated threat theory states that negative out-group attitudes are caused by threat perceptions, negative stereotypes, and intergroup anxiety (Stephan and Stephan, 2000). Perceived 'realistic' threats refer to a perceived conflict of interests over scarce resources. Perceived 'symbolic' threats refer to a perceived conflict of values, norms, and behaviour. Several studies have shown that threat perceptions are related to negative out-group attitudes in general (McLaren, 2003; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders, 2002) and to 'anti-Muslim attitudes' (Savelkoul, Scheepers, Tolsma and Hagendoorn, 2010). Stereotypes are characteristics that an individual links to a group. Intergroup anxiety refers to the fear of being treated negatively in interactions with the out-group (Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan and Martin, 2005). Several studies have shown that negative emotions such as anxiety have an important effect on attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Mackie and Smith, 2003; Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008). Following the integrated threat theory we included *perceptions of threat* posed by Islam/Muslims and Judaism/Jews, *negative clichés* regarding Islam and Judaism, *negative stereotypes* of Muslims and Jews, and intergroup *anxiety* as independent variables in our analyses.

Intergroup contact theory states that direct contact with an out-group prevents or reduces negative out-group attitudes (Allport, 1954). Extensive contact may reduce uncertainty; one grows more familiar with the other. Positive intergroup contact may result in affection for one or more out-group members that can spill over to include the majority of the out-group (Pettigrew, 1998). A meta-analysis reviewing more than 500 studies showed that the frequency of intergroup contact has a reducing effect on negative attitudes, and that this effect is stronger than the reverse effect of attitudes on the intensity

of intergroup contact (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Besides the quantity of contacts, the quality of contact, evaluated positively or negatively, can also have an important effect on attitudes towards out-groups (Hewstone and Brown, 1986; Tausch, Hewstone, Kenworthy, Cairns and Christ, 2007). Positive intergroup contact diminishes perceptions of threat (Ward and Masgoret, 2006). Following the intergroup contact theory we included the *contact frequency* and *contact evaluation* as independent variables in our analyses.

Socialisation theory holds that people acquire negative attitudes towards ethnic out-groups by processing the emotional and informative messages that individuals receive from relevant others (Lasswell, 1977; Dekker, 1991; Jennings, 2007). Family, school, church, mass media, peer group, popular culture, and political and cultural leaders form the main socialization agencies (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007). Messages about Islam and Muslims in the mass media are more negative than positive (Nacos and Torres-Reyna, 2006; Poole and Richardson, 2006; Shadid, 2007, Richardson, 2009). Violent incidents involving Islam throughout the world have dominated the headlines for several years, and have probably contributed to the association of Islam and Muslims with terrorism and a perception of Islam and the Middle East as being a civilization in direct opposition to that of the West (Cashin, 2010), and are likely to have fuelled safety and value threat perceptions (Riek, Mania and Gaertner, 2006). The Internet also offers various sites containing strong anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim messages (Larsson, 2007). In popular culture messages are also more negative than positive (Shaheen, 1997 and 2003; Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008). In several countries political leaders express negative feelings and comments about Islam and Muslims, driven by their own attitudes or by political goals, and may act as ‘sewers’ of Islamophobia (Allen and Nielsen, 2004; Betz and Meret, 2009).<sup>3</sup> Socialization with respect to Judaism and Jews in the 20th century has been documented in various publications (e.g., Goldhagen, 1996; Wegner, 2002; Van Arkel, 2009). Much less is known about this socialization at the present. Meer and Noorani (2008) compared public and media discourse on Judaism/Jews in the 20th century with discourse on Islam/Muslims at the present and concluded that there are similarities but also important differences to be found in such a comparison. A great difference compared with Islamophobia socialization is that in several European countries political leaders and parties which demonstrate a negative attitude towards Islam and Muslims voice anti-anti-Semitism and argue more support for Israel, that is seen a bastion of western civilization fighting for survival, and promote a solidarity with the Israeli people in their fight against Muslim terrorism, e.g., the PVV in the Netherlands, the Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, the Vlaams Belang in Flanders in Belgium, Lega Nord in Italy, the SVP in Switzerland, and the FN in France (Betz and Meret, 2009). Following the socialisation theory we

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<sup>3</sup> In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders, the leader of the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) said that the Qur’an is the source of a ‘sick’, ‘fascist’ ideology inciting ‘death and destruction’, that it ‘wants to kill everything we stand for in a modern western democracy’, that the Islamic culture is ‘inferior to European culture, because it is backward’ (de Volkskrant 08.08.2007). Wilders reiterated his views on Islam in his short film Fitna. If Europe failed to defend ‘the ideas of Rome, Athens and Jerusalem’ and stop the process of Islamization ‘we will lose everything: our cultural identity, our democracy, our rule of law, our liberty, our freedom’ (speech at a conference entitled ‘Facing Islam’ at the Begin Heritage Center in Jerusalem on 14 December 2008).

included *messages from media* and *messages from relevant others* about Islam/Muslims and Judaism/Jews as independent variables in our analyses.

Besides these theories and their main explanatory variables we included self-assessed knowledge about Islam/Muslims and Judaism/Jews as independent variables in our analyses. Various educational publications expect a positive effect of knowledge on attitudes. Several studies have shown correlations between knowledge and out-group attitude (Dekker, Aspeslagh and Meijerink 1998).<sup>4</sup>

Background variables are age, gender, education level, social class and religiosity. A fairly common finding is that older respondents have more negative attitudes towards ethnic out-groups than the younger ones (Chandler and Tsai, 2001), males have more negative out-group attitudes than females, and that more education leads to less negative attitudes towards ethnic out-groups in general (Hello, Scheepers, Vermulst and Gerris, 2004) and Muslims (Fetzer and Soper, 2003). Lower socio-economic status usually translates to more negative attitudes towards out-groups. Research findings show no or weak relationships between religiosity and negative outgroup attitudes (Hunsberger and Jackson, 2005; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello, 2002, respectively) although highly religious people and religious traditionalists have shown more negative views of Islam (Nisbet, Ostman and Shanahan, 2009; Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner, 2009).

#### **4. Procedure**

In order to find an answer to our questions we conducted a survey among Dutch youth. We focused on the Netherlands because the percentages of Muslims in the Netherlands is one of the highest in Europe and much higher than in the USA (Pew Research Center, 2009a). The percentage of Jews is much lower (in 2005 two tenths of a percent of the population; Simon and Schaler, 2007).<sup>5</sup> The Netherlands is also one of the countries with the most ambitious multiculturalism policy at the time of our study (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy, 2005; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007). We focused on young people as the research population because there is growing empirical evidence that fundamental political attitudes are developed at an early age, and that these attitudes, once developed, tend to be long-lasting (Sears, 2003). Moreover, adolescents and young adults can become very politically active and have a greater-than-average preference for protest behaviour.

To prepare the survey questionnaire we held open group discussions. The most important finding was that the young participants Muslims almost always connected to a nationality or ethnicity; all conversations were about Turks or Moroccans. This is not surprising, because more than 90 percent of the people with a Turkish or Moroccan background declared themselves to be Muslim (SCP, 2005: 119), and more than 60 percent of the Muslims in the Netherlands are of Turkish or Moroccan background, while the other 40 percent are dispersed over many small groups (CBS, 2004). Since we knew

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<sup>4</sup> 'We're not witnessing a clash of civilizations. We're witnessing a clash of ignorances, people who don't know each other and therefore fear one another', said Bill Clinton in his summation and closing address of the Clinton Global Initiative in September 2006, cited in World Economic Forum (2008: 85),

<sup>5</sup> In 1940, at the time of the Nazi occupation, some 140.000 Jews lived in the Netherlands, comprising 1.6 percent of the population. Following World War II in 1946, there were only 30.000 Jews. In 2005, the percentage of Jews is much lower than the percentage of Muslims (Simon and Schaler 2007).

from the focus group sessions that Dutch youngsters strongly associate Muslims with Turks and Moroccans, we decided to ask questions in the survey about these two minorities instead of about 'Muslims'.

Secondary schools were used to gain access to the respondents and to obtain a sample for our survey that was stratified along divisions of educational level, gender and opportunity for contact. The fieldwork in 33 third-year groups of eleven secondary schools in the Netherlands was conducted between 14 March and 26 April 2006. In this period no major national or international events took place which could have influenced the answers of a part of the student sample. The questionnaire, containing 104 mainly closed-ended single- and multi-item questions, was completed during regular school hours. The study was presented to the respondents in general words as a study of 'how youngsters think about particular groups in Dutch society'. Various measures were taken to prevent socially desirable and politically correct answers, including questionnaire self-administration and anonymity. In total, 734 respondents from 33 third-year groups in 11 secondary schools in the Netherlands filled out the questionnaire. The questionnaires of those who did not have the Dutch nationality (10), were younger than 14 or older than 16 (17), indicated to be Muslim (63) or Jewish (3), did not fill out the questionnaire seriously (57) were not included in the following analyses. Finally, respondents who had missing values on one of the dependent variables were omitted from the sample, this resulted in a sample of 572 youngsters. Girls and higher-level general education students are slightly over-represented in the sample.<sup>6</sup>

## 5. Measures

The measure of *Islamophobia* included seven questions, asking about the respondent's general attitude towards Islam, general attitude towards Turks and Moroccans, the amount of trust in Turks and Moroccans and any positive or negative feeling he/she expects to experience when getting new neighbours with a Turkish or Moroccan background. The correlations between the attitude towards Islam and the attitude towards Turks or Moroccans were strong ( $r = .54$  and  $.57$  respectively,  $ps < .01$ ), and between the attitudes towards Turks and Moroccans very strong ( $r > .78$ ,  $ps < .01$ ). Confirmatory factor analyses using Mplus 6 showed that the answers to all seven questions form one factor ( $\chi^2 (10, N = 572) = 20.61$ ,  $p = .024$ , CFI = .997; TLI = .993; RMSEA = .043,  $p = .63$ ; SRMR = .021). The three components - general attitude towards Islam, and general and specific attitudes towards Turks and Moroccans, including any feelings about new neighbours with a Turkish or Moroccan background - contributed equally to the Islamophobia factor. We averaged the scores of the single questions into a scale ranging from 1 to 5; the higher the score, the more negative the attitude towards Islam and Muslims.

The measure of *anti-Semitism* included similar questions, asking about the respondent's general attitude towards Judaism and Jews, the amount of trust in Jews and any positive or negative feeling he/she would experience when getting new Jewish neighbours. Confirmatory factor analyses using Mplus6 showed that the answers to these four

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<sup>6</sup> The data set, including the questionnaire, is available for secondary analyses and replication at the Data Archiving and Networked Services from the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research [<http://easy.dans.knaw.nl/dms> under ID p1725].

questions form one factor ( $\chi^2 (2, N = 572) = 9.96, p = .01$ ; CFI = .985; TLI = .956; RMSEA = .083,  $p = .11$ ; SRMR = .020). The two components - general attitude towards Judaism, and general and specific attitudes towards Jews, including any feelings about new Jewish neighbours - contributed equally to the anti-Semitism factor. We averaged the scores of the single questions into a scale ranging from 1 to 5; the higher the score, the more negative the attitude towards Judaism and Jews.

For intergroup contact two variables were constructed, one related to frequency and one related to the evaluation of the contact. *Contact frequency* was measured by asking about the frequency of contact in class, at school, in the neighbourhood and 'somewhere else'. The average score of the answers for Turks and Moroccans respectively Jews were used to construct an index of direct contact with Muslims or Jews, which varies from 'no contact' to 'much contact'. *Contact evaluation* was measured by asking respondents' overall evaluation of the contact with each of the groups.<sup>7</sup> The five-point scale ranges from 'very negative' to 'very positive'. The mean score of the evaluation of contact with Muslims, i.e., Turks and Moroccans, was included in the analysis as well as the answer to the question about the overall evaluation of the contact with Jews.

Two socialisation variables were constructed, one related to socialisation through persons and one related to socialisation through mass media. We measured the socialisation as perceived by the respondents, because we know that parents' and adolescents' reports of socialisation are only moderately correlated and that adolescents' reports of socialization are the most important in predicting adolescents' attitudes (Hughes, Hagelskamp, Way and Foust 2009). *Socialisation by persons* was measured by asking the respondents about the attitude of their grandfather, grandmother, (foster) father, (foster) mother, favourite teacher and best friend towards three religions – Islam, Christianity, and Judaism - and four groups - Turks, Moroccans, Dutch, and Jews. The index of the perceived attitude from relevant others towards Islam and Muslims, respectively Judaism and Jews, was calculated as the average score of all six socialisers. A higher score reflects a more positive perceived attitude. *Socialisation by media* was measured by the evaluation (positive or negative) of the information provided by newspapers, television news, other news programmes on TV, and Internet with respect to the three religions and the four groups. Internet was left out in subsequent analyses because there appeared to be hardly any variation regarding the use of this medium. The answers concerning the content of newspapers, TV news and other news programmes on TV with respect to Islam and Muslims, respectively Judaism and Jews were averaged into socialization by media indices, varying from very negative to very positive.

*Self-esteem* was measured by means of ten statements, which were translations and adaptations of the Rosenberg's (1965) 'self-esteem scale' items.<sup>8</sup> The reactions to the statements formed a reliable scale ( $\alpha = .91$ ) and the mean score of the statements was included as the scale value. A higher score indicates a higher level of self-esteem.

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<sup>7</sup> Contact evaluation question: 'How do you in general evaluate the contact with the people from these groups?'

<sup>8</sup> Self-esteem items: 'On the whole, I am satisfied with myself', 'Sometimes I feel worthless', 'I think I do have certain qualities', 'I can do things as well as other people', 'I feel I don't have much to be proud of', 'Sometimes I feel useless', 'I feel as worthy as other people', 'I wish I had more self respect', 'I tend to feel being a failure', 'I feel positive about myself'.

The national attitude was measured by statements reflecting differences in positivism towards one's own national group (Dekker, Malová and Hoogendoorn, 2003). Factor analysis revealed two distinct factors, representing *patriotism* (factor loadings > .75; alpha = .89) and *nationalism* (factor loadings > .62; alpha = .91).<sup>9</sup> Both scales consist of the mean scores of the statements; higher values reflect stronger patriotism or stronger nationalism, respectively.

*Perceived threat* was measured by statements reflecting economic, safety, and value threats. One of these statements refers to Islam, two to Muslims, and four to Turks and Moroccans.<sup>10</sup> The same statements are asked with respect to Judaism and Jews. All statements were coded in such a way that a higher score indicated a higher perceived threat. Two threat scales were constructed: one concerning perceived threat of *Islam and Muslims* (factor loadings > .50, alpha = .82) and one concerning perceived threat of *Judaism and Jews* (factor loadings > .57, alpha = .66).

*Negative clichés* and *stereotypes* were measured using questions asking whether or not the respondent thought that certain characteristics apply to the religions and ethnic groups.<sup>11</sup> To prevent bias we included an equal number of negative and positive clichés and stereotypes in the questions, and asked the questions for all three religions and four groups. Respondents received one point for every negative cliché or stereotype assigned. Two scales were constructed for each of the two out-groups: negative clichés about the religion (alphas are .62 and .51 for *Islam* and *Judaism* respectively) and negative stereotypes about the groups (alphas are .84 and .75 for *Muslims* and *Jews* respectively).

*Anxiety* was measured by asking respondents whether or not they had experienced emotions of 'fear' and 'uneasiness' with respect to the three religions and the four groups. Fear and uneasiness with respect to Islam, Turks and Moroccans were averaged into one reliable scale of *anxiety towards Islam and Muslims* (alpha = .82). Fear and uneasiness with respect to Judaism and Jews were averaged into one reliable scale of *anxiety towards Judaism and Jews* (alpha = .65).

*Knowledge* was measured by the self-assessed level of knowledge about the religions and groups. The answers to the questions about Islam, Turks and Moroccans were averaged to construct one scale for knowledge about Islam/Muslims, while the answers to the questions about Judaism and Jews were averaged to construct one scale for knowledge about Judaism/Jews, with values ranging from 'no knowledge' (1) to 'much knowledge' (5).

*Age*, *gender* and *education level* were measured by the usual single items. *Social class* was subjectively measured by the estimated relative income of the parents. *Religiosity*

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<sup>9</sup> The patriotism factor and scale consists of the statements 'I am happy to be Dutch', 'I love the Netherlands', 'I am proud to be Dutch', and 'I am proud of the Netherlands'. The nationalism factor and scale consists of the statements 'I prefer to hang around with Dutch people', 'I like Dutch people better than inhabitants of other countries', 'the Dutch are better', 'I like hanging around with Dutch people best', 'the Dutch nationality is the best nationality', and 'the Netherlands is the best country to live in'.

<sup>10</sup> Perceived Islam threat items: 'Islam and democracy are hard to combine', 'The opinions of Muslims and the Dutch are in general the same', 'Muslims who maintain their own culture threaten the Dutch culture', 'Turks [Moroccans] take the jobs of the Dutch', 'I feel unsafe when I meet a group of Turks [Moroccans] on the street'.

<sup>11</sup> Clichés of religions: 'old-fashioned', 'violent', 'dominant', and 'unfriendly towards women'. Stereotypes of groups: 'rude', 'selfish', 'aggressive', 'arrogant', 'clumsy', and 'dominant'.

was measured by asking respondents how often they attend religious services, on a five-point scale ranging from never (1) to at least once a week (5).

## 6. Islamophobia and anti-Semitism

To test whether Islamophobia and anti-Semitism were two separate factors, or part of one general construct a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted. The results showed that a two factor model (Islamophobia and anti-Semitism) provides a good fit to the data ( $\chi^2$  (31,  $N = 572$ ) = 52.16,  $p = .01$ ; CFI = .995; TLI = .992; RMSEA = .035,  $p = .945$ ; SRMR = .030). In contrast, a model in which the components of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism would be part of one general construct, provided a worse model fit ( $\chi^2$  (31,  $N = 572$ ) = 162.32,  $p < .001$ ; CFI = .971; TLI = .948; RMSEA = .086,  $p < .001$ ; SRMR = .055). These results support our assumption that Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are two different factors.

Negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims were more widespread than negative attitudes towards Judaism and Jews; the level of Islamophobia was significantly higher than the attitude of anti-Semitism ( $\Delta M = .53$ ,  $t(571) = 14.77$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

On average, respondents had a negative attitude towards Islam and Muslims ( $M = 3.17$ ,  $SD = .86$ ). More than half of the respondents had a negative to very negative attitude towards Islam and Muslims (54%), whereas four out of ten respondents had a positive to very positive attitude (40%).<sup>12</sup> Respondents were slightly more positive about Muslims than about their religion, but the difference was small and insignificant ( $\Delta M = -.06$ ;  $t(571) = -1.521$ ,  $p = .129$ ). The correlation between attitudes towards Islam and Muslims was strong ( $r = .59$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

On average, respondents had a positive attitude towards Judaism and Jews ( $M = 2.64$ ,  $SD = 0.74$ ;  $t(571) = -11.63$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Fifteen percent had a very positive attitude, whereas about one-fifth of the respondents had a negative to very negative (5 percent) attitude towards Judaism and Jews. There was a small but significant difference between the attitude towards Judaism and the attitude towards Jews; respondents were slightly more positive about Jews than about their religion ( $\Delta M = .31$ ;  $t(571) = 7.16$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The correlation between attitudes towards Judaism and Jews was moderately strong ( $r = .46$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

A strong correlation was found between the attitudes towards Islam/Muslims and attitudes towards Judaism/Jews ( $r = .55$ ,  $p < .001$ ). This suggests that people who have negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims are more likely to have a negative attitude towards Judaism and Jews and vice versa.<sup>13</sup>

*Contact frequency* with either Muslims or Jews was low; four out of ten respondents report having only seldom or occasionally direct contact with Muslims, while eight of ten indicate having only seldom or occasionally contact with Jews. Having personal contact correlates negatively with both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism ( $r = -.43$ ,  $p < .001$  and  $r = -.21$ ,  $p < .001$ , respectively). *Contact evaluation* was mainly positive (38 and 37 percent for contact with Muslims and Jews respectively) or neutral (31 and 44 percent

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<sup>12</sup> This finding is similar to the findings from the Pew Research Centre 2005 poll, in which 51 percent of the Dutch respondents reported unfavourable opinions about Muslims.

<sup>13</sup> Echebarria-Echabe and Guede (2007) also found a strong correlation between their 'anti-Arab' scale and anti-Semitism (.61,  $p < .01$ ).

respectively). Contact with Muslims was more often evaluated negatively (30 percent) than contact with Jews (20 percent). The evaluation of personal contact as positive or negative had a strong bivariate correlation with Islamophobia ( $r = -.70$ ) and anti-Semitism ( $r = -.50$ ), supporting the expectation that positive contact reduces negative out-group attitudes.

Strong associations with Islamophobia and anti-Semitism were further found with *socialization by persons*, i.e. the perceived attitudes of relevant others ( $r_s = -.68$  and  $-.47$  for Islamophobia and anti-Semitism respectively). A more positive perceived attitude of relevant others (grandparents, parents, favourite teacher and best friend) was associated with a reduced level of Islamophobia or anti-Semitism. However, the relevant others were mainly perceived to be negative about Islam and Muslims (62 percent, whereas only 24 percent perceived their socializers had a positive attitude towards Islam and Muslims) and neutral (30 percent) or negative (34 percent) about Judaism and Jews. Furthermore, it should be noticed that the respondents did not talk frequently about these topics with their relevant others. One-fourth of the respondents talked only seldomly about Islam or Muslims and having conversations about Judaism and Jews was also scarce, with 60 percent of the respondents indicating to talk never to seldomly about these topics.

The *socialization by mass media*, i.e. the perceived information about Islam and Muslims respondents received from the various mass media, is also mainly (very) negative (64 percent evaluated mass media as being negative to very negative about Islam and Muslims, compared to 24 percent who perceived mass media as (very) negative about Judaism and Jews). With respect to Judaism and Jews, the media was mainly considered to be neutral in their reports (56 percent, compared to 26 percent of the respondents who perceived mass media to be neutral about Islam and Muslims). The perceived mass media content has a weak correlation with the attitudes of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism ( $r_s = -.28$  and  $-.18$  respectively); negative perceptions of media reporting enhance negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims and towards Judaism and Jews.

Most respondents indicated to know little to nothing about Islam and Muslims (51 percent) and Judaism and Jews (74 percent). One-fifth of the respondents reported much to very much *knowledge* about Islam and Muslims, compared to only one-tenth of the respondents with respect to Judaism and Jews. A lack of self-assessed knowledge enhanced attitudes of Islamophobia ( $r = -.12$ ) and anti-Semitism ( $r = -.29$ ).

Respondents generally did not perceive much threat of the outgroups, although significant differences between *perceived threat* from Islam and Muslims on the one hand, and from Judaism and Jews on the other were found ( $\Delta M = .57$ ,  $t(559) = 15.61$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Twelve percent of the respondents experienced high levels of threat posed by Islam and Muslims, compared to 2 percent for Judaism and Jews. Almost half (48 percent) of the respondents did not perceive any threat posed by Islam and Muslims, while 75 percent indicated to perceive no threat of Judaism and Jews. In addition to higher levels of perceived threat posed by Islam and Muslims than by Judaism and Jews, respondents assigned more *negative clichés* to Islam than to Judaism ( $\Delta M = .40$ ) and more *negative stereotypes* to Muslims, i.e. Turks and Moroccans, than to Jews ( $\Delta M = .36$ ). Respondents reported more *anxiety* when thinking about Islam and Muslims than when referring to Judaism and Jews ( $\Delta M = .41$ ). Threat perception, negative clichés, negative stereotypes,

and anxiety were positively related to Islamophobia ( $r_s = .65, .34, .42, .34, p_s < .001$  respectively) and anti-Semitism ( $r = .43, .16, .10, .19, p_s < .05$  respectively).

Most respondents have a positive attitude towards the Netherlands and the Dutch (*patriotism*,  $M = 3.95$ ,  $SD = .93$ ), which is weakly associated with attitudes towards Islam and Muslims ( $r = .22, p < .001$ ), but not significantly with the attitude towards Judaism and Jews ( $r = .05, p = .23$ ). More than a third of the respondents (36 percent) has a very positive national attitude (*nationalism*,  $M = 2.75$ ,  $SD = 1.11$ ), which is positively associated with Islamophobia and anti-Semitism ( $r_s = .56$  and  $.30$  respectively). There were not many respondents who suffer from a very low or low *self-esteem* (5 percent), while more than two-thirds has a high or very high self-esteem. Self-esteem was not significantly related to Islamophobia or anti-Semitism.

In sum, Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are different constructs. Islamophobia was more widespread than anti-Semitism. Respondents had more contact with Muslims than with Jews, but evaluated the contact with Muslims more negatively than contact with Jews. Information respondents received from relevant others and mass media was more often evaluated negatively when it concerned Islam and Muslims than when it concerned Judaism and Jews. Respondents indicated to know more about Islam and Muslims than about Judaism and Jews. Finally, respondents indicated to perceive more threat, have more negative clichés and stereotypes, and experience higher levels of anxiety with respect to Islam and Muslims than with respect to Judaism and Jews. The bivariate correlations of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism with the predictor variables were all in the expected directions, that is, negative correlations with positive contact experiences, positive information from relevant others, and knowledge, and positive correlations with perceptions of threat, negative clichés and stereotypes, anxiety, and nationalism. In the next step the explanatory models of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism will be compared.<sup>14</sup>

Regression analyses of the two dependent variables were the next steps in our data analysis. The first set regressions included the other dependent variable as an independent variable – anti-Semitism as an independent for Islamophobia and Islamophobia as an independent for anti-Semitism - because of the strong correlations that we found between the attitude towards Islam and Muslims and the attitude towards Judaism and Jews. The second set regressions included all variables suggested by intergroup contact, socialisation, integrated threat, and social identity theories. The third set regressions included the other dependent variable and the variables suggested by the theories. In all three regressions we controlled for the demographic variables - gender, age, subjective social class, and education level - and for religiosity.

The regression analysis of the respondents' attitudes towards Islam and Muslims, including the attitude towards Judaism and Jews (Table 1, first data column), shows that this latter attitude is a strong predictor for the attitude towards Islam and Muslims ( $\beta = .51, p < .001$ ). The attitude towards Islam and Muslims is in turn a strong predictor for the attitude towards Judaism and Jews ( $\beta = .52, p < .001$ ; Table 1, second data column).

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<sup>14</sup> Our study was the first empirical study to explain attitudes towards Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands. Another study carried out among the same research population in 2006-2007 supports our findings of a high percentage of respondents with negative attitudes (47 percent), positive relationships with negative stereotypes and perceived symbolic threat, and a negative relationship with intergroup contact (Velasco González, Verkuyten, Weesie, and Poppe, 2008).

There are differences between the empirical explanatory models of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism: gender (boys were more negative) and age predict Islamophobia but not anti-Semitism, while education level and religiosity predict anti-Semitism but not Islamophobia. The model explains 35 percent of the variance in attitude towards Islam and Muslims and 34 percent of the variance in attitude towards Judaism and Jews.

**Table 1**

	Negative attitude towards Islam and Muslims				Negative attitude towards Judaism and Jews			
	B	(SE)	Beta	95 % Confidence Interval B	B	(SE)	Beta	95 % Confidence Interval B
<i>(Constant)</i>	-0.01	(.68)		-1.36 - 1.33	1.41	(.59)		0.25 - 2.58
Gender (male)	0.34	(.06)	.20***	0.23 - 0.46	0.05	(.05)	.04	-0.05 - 0.16
Age	0.10	(.05)	.07*	0.01 - 0.19	0.01	(.04)	.01	-0.07 - 0.08
Social class	-0.01	(.01)	-.03	-0.02 - 0.01	-0.00	(.01)	-.01	-0.01 - 0.01
Educational level	0.02	(.03)	.03	-0.03 - 0.08	-0.09	(.02)	-.14***	-0.13 - -0.04
Religiosity	0.01	(.02)	.02	-0.03 - 0.06	-0.07	(.02)	-.11**	-0.11 - -0.03
Anti-Semitism Islamophobia	0.59	(.04)	.51***	0.51 - 0.67	0.45	(.03)	.52***	0.39 - 0.51
R <sup>2</sup>			.35***				.34***	

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$

N = 572

The regression analysis of the respondents' attitudes towards Islam and Muslims, including all variables suggested by the intergroup contact, socialisation, integrated threat, and social identity theories (Table 2, first data column), shows that the evaluation of direct contact with Muslims is the main predictor for the attitude towards Islam and Muslims ( $\beta = -.32$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The socialization by persons, i.e. the perceived attitude towards Islam and Muslims of relevant others, and threat perception are also strong predictors of this attitude ( $\beta = -.24$ ,  $p < .001$  and  $\beta = .21$ ,  $p < .001$ , respectively). Nationalism is another strong predictor of the attitude ( $\beta = .15$ ,  $p < .001$ ), whereas patriotism, as expected, has no significant effect. Negative clichés about Islam weakly predict Islamophobia ( $\beta = .07$ ,  $p < .05$ ). The model explains 67 percent of the variance in attitude towards Islam and Muslims.

The main predictors of the respondents' attitude towards Judaism and Jews are the socialization by relevant others and perceived threat ( $\beta = -.20$ ,  $p < .001$  and  $\beta = .18$ ,  $p < .001$ ) (Table 2, second data column). Other predictors are nationalism ( $\beta = .15$ ,  $p < .01$ ), knowledge ( $\beta = -.13$ ,  $p < .01$ ), contact evaluation ( $\beta = -.12$ ,  $p < .01$ ), socialization by mass media ( $\beta = -.09$ ,  $p < .05$ ), religiosity ( $\beta = -.09$ ,  $p < .01$ ), and intergroup anxiety ( $\beta = .08$ ,  $p < .05$ ). The model explains 40 percent of the variance in attitude towards Judaism and Jews.

There are similarities and differences between the empirical explanatory models of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. Contact evaluation, socialization by persons, perceived threat, nationalism and gender are predictors for both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. Negative clichés and age predict Islamophobia but not anti-Semitism, while socialization

by mass media, knowledge, intergroup anxiety and religiosity predict anti-Semitism but not Islamophobia.

**Table 2**

	Negative attitude towards Islam and Muslims			Negative attitude towards Judaism and Jews		
	B (SE)	Beta	95 % Confidence Interval B	B (SE)	Beta	95 % Confidence Interval B
(Constant)	0.89 (.52)		-0.13 - 1.90	1.29 (.62)		0.08 - 2.50
Gender (male)	0.18 (.05)	.11***	0.09 - 0.28	0.17 (.06)	.11***	0.06 - 0.28
Age	0.08 (.03)	.06*	0.02 - 0.15	0.07 (.04)	.06	-0.01 - 0.15
Social class	0.00 (.01)	.00	-0.01 - 0.01	-0.00 (.01)	-.03	-0.02 - 0.01
Educational level	-0.00 (.02)	-.00	-0.04 - 0.04	-0.02 (.02)	-.04	-0.07 - 0.02
Religiosity	-0.01 (.02)	-.01	-0.04 - 0.03	-0.05 (.02)	-.09**	-0.09 - -0.01
Contact – frequency	0.02 (.04)	.02	-0.05 - 0.09	-0.01 (.04)	-.01	-0.09 - 0.06
Contact – evaluation	-0.28 (.03)	-.32***	-0.35 - -0.22	-0.13 (.04)	-.12**	-0.21 - -0.04
Socialization by persons	-0.27 (.04)	-.24***	-0.35 - -0.20	-0.20 (.04)	-.20***	-0.28 - -0.13
Socialization by media	-0.07 (.04)	-.05	-0.15 - 0.01	-0.13 (.05)	-.09*	-0.24 - -0.03
Knowledge	-0.02 (.03)	-.02	-0.09 - 0.04	-0.12 (.04)	-.13**	-0.19 - -0.05
Perceived threat	0.22 (.04)	.21***	0.15 - 0.29	0.21 (.04)	.18***	0.12 - 0.30
Negative cliches	0.19 (.08)	.07*	0.03 - 0.35	0.05 (.12)	.02	-0.19 - 0.29
Negative stereotypes	0.00 (.09)	.00	-0.18 - 0.17	0.07 (.11)	.02	-0.15 - 0.29
Intergroup anxiety	0.11 (.07)	.05	-0.04 - 0.26	0.25 (.12)	.08*	0.02 - 0.49
Self-esteem	-0.05 (.03)	-.04	-0.11 - 0.01	0.02 (.04)	.02	-0.06 - 0.09
Patriotism	-0.02 (.03)	-.02	-0.07 - 0.04	-0.06 (.03)	-.07	-0.12 - 0.00
Nationalism	0.12 (.03)	.15***	0.06 - 0.17	0.10 (.03)	.15**	0.04 - 0.16
R <sup>2</sup>		.67***			.40***	

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .05$   
N = 572

The regression analysis of the attitude towards Islam and Muslims including the attitude towards Judaism and Jews in addition to the variables suggested by the intergroup contact, socialisation, integrated threat, and social identity theories (Table 3; first data column), shows that the attitude towards Judaism and Jews is a strong predictor for the attitude towards Islam and Muslims. Actually the attitude towards Judaism and Jews is now the strongest predictor of the attitude towards Islam and Muslims ( $\beta = .31, p < .001$ ). However, contact evaluation, socialization by relevant others, and perceived threat continue to be strong predictors ( $\beta = -.27, p < .001, \beta = -.20, p < .001, \text{ and } \beta = .21, p < .001$ ). Intergroup anxiety is a new predictor ( $\beta = .07, p < .01$ ), while negative clichés no longer predict the attitude. This model explains 75 percent of the variance in attitude towards Islam and Muslims.

The regression analysis of the attitude towards Judaism and Jews, including the attitude towards Islam and Muslims in addition to the variables derived from the intergroup contact, socialisation, integrated threat, and social identity theories (Table 3; second data column), shows that the attitude towards Islam and Muslims is the main predictor ( $\beta = .46, p < .001$ ). Contact evaluation, socialization by relevant others, subjective knowledge, and perceived threat, and intergroup anxiety continue to be predictors ( $\beta = -.10, p < .01, \beta = -.15, p < .001, \beta = -.15, p < .001, \beta = .15, p < .001, \text{ and } \beta$

= .11,  $p < .01$ , respectively). This model explains 52 percent of the variance in attitude towards Judaism and Jews.

There are again similarities and differences between the empirical explanatory models of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. Contact evaluation, socialization by relevant others, perceived threat, intergroup anxiety and the other out-group attitude are predictors for both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. The other out-group attitude has most effect on both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. Nationalism, gender and age predict Islamophobia but not anti-Semitism, while religiosity, knowledge, and self-esteem predict anti-Semitism but not Islamophobia.

**Table 3**

	Negative attitude towards Islam and Muslims				Negative attitude towards Judaism and Jews			
	B	(SE)	Beta	95 % Confidence Interval B	B	(SE)	Beta	95 % Confidence Interval B
(Constant)	0.09	.46		-0.81 - 0.99	1.24	(.55)		0.15 - 2.33
Gender (male)	0.14	.04	.08**	0.05 - 0.22	0.03	(.05)	.02	-0.07 - 0.13
Age	0.07	.03	.05*	0.01 - 0.12	0.01	(.04)	.01	-0.06 - 0.08
Social class	0.00	.00	.01	-0.01 - 0.01	-0.00	(.01)	-.01	-0.01 - 0.01
Educational level	0.03	.02	.04	-0.01 - 0.06	-0.04	(.02)	-.06	-0.08 - 0.00
Religiosity	0.02	.02	.03	-0.01 - 0.05	-0.04	(.02)	-.07*	-0.08 - -0.01
Contact – frequency	-0.00	.03	-.00	-0.06 - 0.06	0.00	(.03)	.00	-0.07 - 0.07
Contact – evaluation	-0.24	.03	-.27***	-0.30 - -0.19	-0.11	(.04)	-.10**	-0.18 - -0.03
Socialization by persons	-0.23	.03	-.20***	-0.29 - -0.17	-0.15	(.04)	-.15***	-0.22 - -0.08
Socialization by media	-0.07	.04	-.04	-0.13 - 0.00	-0.09	(.05)	-.06	-0.19 - 0.00
Knowledge	0.02	.03	.01	-0.04 - 0.08	-0.14	(.03)	-.15***	-0.20 - -0.08
Perceived threat	0.21	.03	.21***	0.15 - 0.27	0.17	(.04)	.15***	0.09 - 0.25
Negative cliches	0.13	.07	.05	-0.01 - 0.27	0.10	(.11)	.03	-0.12 - 0.31
Negative stereotypes	0.02	.08	.01	-0.14 - 0.17	0.09	(.10)	.03	-0.10 - 0.29
Intergroup anxiety	0.16	.07	.07**	0.03 - 0.28	0.33	(.11)	.11**	0.12 - 0.54
Self-esteem	-0.05	.03	-.04	-0.10 - 0.00	0.08	(.03)	.08*	0.01 - 0.14
Patriotism	0.02	.02	.02	-0.03 - 0.07	-0.04	(.03)	-.05	-0.10 - 0.01
Nationalism	0.07	.03	.09**	0.02 - 0.12	-0.05	(.03)	-.08	-0.11 - 0.00
Anti-Semitism	0.36	.03	.31***	0.31 - 0.42				
Islamophobia					0.40	(.03)	.46***	0.33 - 0.46
R <sup>2</sup>			.75***				.52***	

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$

N = 572

## 7. Conclusion and discussion

In social psychology, two approaches have dominated inquiry into the causes of negative out-group attitudes or prejudices (Duckitt and Sibley, 2010). One approach explains these attitudes in terms of specific group or intergroup processes. At the core are variables such as perceived threat. The second approach, based on the observation of moderate to strong correlations between attitudes to quite different outgroups, explains negative out-group attitudes in terms of a people's propensity to hold generally negative attitudes and to generalize a negative attitude over various outgroups due to a stable personality

characteristic or basic value preference of these individuals. At the core are variables such as right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, which are in turn expected to be the effect of a need for negative attitudes towards outgroups and those who are different.

Our study of Islamophobia falls more in the first than in the second approach, although the explanatory model was based on general out-group explanatory theories, including social identity theory, integrated threat theory, intergroup contact theory, and socialisation theory. Most variables were directly related to the specific out-group of Muslims and their religion Islam. The more general variables were religiosity, self-esteem, patriotism, and nationalism. The two studies named in the first paragraph, including an analysis of Islamophobia (Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner, 2009; Zick, Küpper and Hövermann, 2011) combine the two approaches. The findings from both studies suggest that individuals do tend to generalize a negative attitude over various outgroups indeed and that this tendency is mainly the effect of stable personality characteristics such as right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. In recently published social psychological research, the second approach dominates (is our impression), suggesting that general personality characteristics are the main explanations for negative out-group attitudes, including Islamophobia.

This motivated us to reanalyse our dataset that included answers to questions about Islam/Muslims and one other out-group namely Judaism/Jews, and asked ourselves a set of questions: Are Islamophobia and anti-Semitism two different constructs? Are the levels of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism similar? Are the correlations between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism high? Does Islamophobia contribute to the explanation of anti-Semitism and does anti-Semitism partly explain the variance in Islamophobia? Are the origins of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism similar?

Our findings show that Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are two separate factors rather than part of one general construct. A two factor model rather than a one factor model provides a good fit to the data. The percentages of respondents with negative attitudes towards Islam/Muslims and negative attitudes towards Judaism/Jews clearly differ. More than half of the respondents had a negative to very negative attitude towards Islam and Muslims (54 percent), while 'only' one-fifth of the respondents had a negative to very negative attitude towards Judaism and Jews. The level of Islamophobia was significantly higher than the attitude of anti-Semitism. The correlation between attitude towards Islam and Muslims and attitude towards Judaism and Jews was strong ( $r = .55$ ;  $p < .001$ ). This suggests that people who have negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims are more likely to have also a negative attitude towards Judaism and Jews. The other out-group attitude, together with the demographic variables and religiosity, explains 35 percent of the variance in attitude towards Islam and Muslims and 34 percent of the variance in attitude towards Judaism and Jews (Table 1). The origins of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are partly the same. Contact evaluation, socialization by persons, perceived threat, nationalism and gender are predictors for both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. Negative clichés and age predict Islamophobia but not anti-Semitism, while socialization by mass media, knowledge, intergroup anxiety and religiosity predict anti-Semitism but not Islamophobia (Table 2). Nationalism is a common underlying general variable but religiosity is a predictor for anti-Semitism and not for Islamophobia (no support for Geisser's 2003 'religiophobia' thesis), while patriotism and self-esteem have no

significant effect on both dependents. Unfortunately we could not test the effect of authoritarianism and social dominance orientation because these variables were not included in our questionnaire. The other out-group attitude is, however, the main predictor for both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism (Table 3). By adding the other out-group attitude – anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, respectively - to the list of independent variables the explained variance in attitude towards Islam and Muslims increases with 8% and the one for the attitude towards Judaism and Jews with 12% (Table 2 and 3).

These findings support the notion of Islamophobia as a distinct construct and that the other out-group attitude only partly contributes to the explanation of Islamophobia. This suggests that Islamophobia is only partly an expression of a general negative out-group attitude. Islam and Muslim specific cognitions, emotions, and direct contact and socialization experiences need to be included in the explanatory model if we want to understand the individual's development of Islamophobia.

Notwithstanding this, the strong correlation between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism and the high  $\beta$  of anti-Semitism in the Islamophobia regression analysis invite us to further investigation of the influence of more general personality characteristics, and their underlying fundamental social world views and basic value preferences, and their socialization origins. However, recent research conducted by Duckitt and colleagues reduces the pretensions of the second approach by showing that the assumption that right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation influence attitudes against all or most outgroups in broadly similar fashion does not hold (Duckitt and Sibley 2010). The new model focus on the profound attitudinal differences towards different out-groups rather than on the negative attitude towards outgroups in general and suggests that right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, because they express different motivationally based values, have differential effects on attitudes towards particular outgroups (Dual Process Model; Duriez, Van Hiel, and Kossowska 2005, Duriez and Soenens 2006). Research findings support the new differential prediction, differential mediation and differential moderation hypotheses and 'are therefore not consistent with the widely held, though often implicit, assumption in the traditional research literature on right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation that these two individual difference variables involve a basic disposition to dislike outgroups generally that would be relatively invariant across intergroup context' (Duckitt and Sibley 2010: 596). Each of these findings invites further research to fully explain the individuals' development of negative out-group attitudes in general and Islamophobia in particular.

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Diane Frost defines Islamophobia as anti-Muslim feeling and violence based on "race" or religion.[63] Islamophobia may also target people who have Muslim names, or have a look that is associated with Muslims.[64] According to Alan Johnson, Islamophobia sometimes can be nothing more than xenophobia or racism "wrapped in religious terms." [65] Sociologists Yasmin Hussain and Paul Bagguley stated. "The achievement in the study of anti-Semitism of examining Jewry and anti-Semitism separately must also be transferred to other racisms, such as Islamophobia. We do not need more information about Islam, but more information about the making of racist stereotypes in general. The terms anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are common in the media, but what do they actually refer to? Has traditional anti-Semitism run its historical course while Islamophobia threatens to become the defining condition of the new unified Europe? Both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are phenomena of exclusion of minorities, but does that make them comparable? And if yes, in what ways can such an attempt at comparison escape the pitfall of analogizing the historical situation of the Jew and the contemporary situation of Muslims? Anti prejudice tools. Individual and institutional ways to reform prejudiced attitudes and practices. Learn more. Key issues. Short and long-form pieces on matters related to Islamophobia and American Muslims in the U.S. LEARN MORE. Featured Articles. In the current political environment, anti-Muslim bigotry and Islamophobia have become pervasive features of American public life. Whether in formal politics or national media, it is common to see and hear negative stereotypes and fear-mongering messaging about Muslims and their place in society. Fortunately, there are a number of efforts underway across the country to limit the impact and influence of those promoting these ideas. However, Read More.