

Re-Energizing India US Relations

Iram Khalid

University of the Punjab, Lahore

ABSTRACT

President Barak Obama's visit to India is an attempt to fulfill the need to re-energized India US relations. Both are looking towards each other as friends and potential partners in strategic, economic and military fields. US Policy is to serve its vital interest by facilitating India's emergence as global power. The factors like poverty, inequality, terrorism, internal and external threats are forcing the states to opt the comprehensive security approach to meet these challenges. The strategic dialogue between US and India is taking place since 2001. This process is further strengthening the relations which are more specific and dimensional now. This present study is an attempt to evaluate India-US relations with this perspective. While concluding the argument it seems as the new geo political landscape is mapped out.

KEY WORDS: Re-energized, Vital interest, Global Power, Comprehensive Security, Geopolitics,

Introduction

South Asian region comprise Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, falls in the conflictual security complex. In this region, where distribution of power and socially constructed processes of conflict and cooperation reinforces each other. Preponderance of Indian power both in terms of size and resources characterized politico security matrix of South Asia. India, a nation of over one billion people, accounts for 75% of regions population, 63% of total area and 78% of its GDP. The other important state, Pakistan despite being a nuclear armed state is much smaller in size and economic potential.

All South Asian states shared land and maritime borders with India and not with each other. Nepal and Bhutan are not only landlocked but also India locked. Bangladesh is vitally India locked. The inclusion of Afghanistan has changed the politico security equation in the region. The present situation in Afghanistan has added complexity to it.

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South Asia's security concerns are deep rooted. The states of the region from the earlier phase tried to protect their national interest by opting different strategies. To counter security risk the states of this complexed region followed the traditional security approach by following arms race then, tried politics of alliance etc. The results were not matched. So bilateral efforts were also tried to resolve the tensions, like Simla Agreement, but the core issues had never been settled. Being the critical actor of world politics, US had kept an eye on different developments in this region. Pakistan remained the friend of need but India was chosen as the permanent part of US long term objectives .Revising its traditions US again felt the need to re energizes the relations with India to manage its economic situation and internal pressure. President Obama's current visit is an effort to plan out new priorities.

India has always been a significant state in the region for US. Since inception, India tried to maintain neutral trend in its foreign policy. India sorted to maintain relation with both US and Russia. The political development of world furthered US-India relations and they gave more directional approach to their relationship. US presence in Afghanistan paved way for deep Indian involvement in the region.

India's emergence as an economic power is also the focus of US attention. Now the economic interest of US lies in India also. President Obama's visit to India in Nov-2010 was an attempt to emphasize on bilateral relations in economic sector. US realize the importance of Pakistan in the stability of region especially and to the world generally. This has an impact on US-India relations. But apart from all other factors US gives special importance to its relations with India. This article is an attempt to analyzes these relations in the perspective of changing global realities.

American Trends in South Asia

For decades US never opted a comprehensive policy towards South Asia.US normally treated South Asia on the basis of action and reaction.

Historical Context

After involvement of America in WW II, Washington started to pay attention towards India. In early era after independence United States was least interested in South Asia and left it to Britain to handle. On Kashmir dispute, Americans also followed British lead in trying towards any satisfactory solution. US press covered Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's trip to America in friendly manner though showed a far less interest, it showed earlier on the visit of Indian Prime Minister Nehru. In 1954 Eisenhower became president of America and he appointed J. F. Dulles as Secretary of State. Dulles visited India and Pakistan in May that year. His talks with Indian leaders confirmed his skepticism about

India's neutralist approach. At the same time when the idea of SEATO arose; British invited South Asian countries to attend the meeting at Manila only Pakistan attended it and India didn't.

During the second term of Eisenhower, Americans stressed more on bolstering India's economic development than on strengthening Pakistan's defense. Pakistan became increasingly dependent on America. The Americans were having greater leaning towards India. They did not support Pakistan on Kashmir issue lest it would annoy India. When Pakistan Prime Minister HS Suhrawardy visited Washington in 1957, he complained about Kashmir and that India would also divert waters from Pakistan. The American listened politely but made no promise to adopt tougher line towards India.

In May 1961 Vice President Lyndon Johnson visited Pakistan. With regard to economic assistance the new administration adopted a lukewarm attitude toward Pakistan in contrast to India that was getting \$1 billion annually. Pakistan was promised only \$150 billion. In July 1961 Ayub Khan paid his first visit to the US as president of Pakistan. At this time Kennedy administration wanted the visit to be a success. Ayub explained his country's apprehension about Indian threat. Though Kennedy agreed to support Pakistan on Kashmir at the UN, he refused to use economic assistance to India as a lever on Kashmir. Ayub also expressed his reservations on giving military aid to India. Kennedy promised he would talk to Ayub if ever consider giving arms to India. The two presidents sharply disagreed about Chinese representation at the UN. However, Ayub was satisfied with the promises of bilateral economic aid. USAID provided large scale funding for improving irrigation system in Pakistan. Ayub's trip was considered a considerable success (Kux, 2001: 100-156).

Ayub also met Kennedy in 1962 when he second time visited America for a UN session and discussed Kashmir issue with them. Kennedy again refused to use economic assistance to India as a lever to negotiate on Kashmir. On the other hand America's increased economic aid to India was upsetting Pakistan because due to this assistance India was able to divert more resources towards military build up. Meanwhile Sino-Indian war erupted in 1962 and Washington in a desire to respond rapidly to New Delhi's plea for help overlooked Kennedy's promise to consult Pakistan before giving military aid to India deeply offended Ayub. Not only Ayub, the entire political spectrum in Pakistan was opposed to US military aid to India. On the situation Pakistani ambassador in the US complained Kennedy that America was proceeding with long term aid to India despite the fact Chinese threat to India was receding and there was no progress on Kashmir. The President disagreed and spoke sharply about Pakistan's move towards China and anti-US commentaries in Pakistani press.

During the Ford's Presidency, South Asia was not an area of major concern for Washington. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto remained preoccupied with the continuing American embargo against weapon transfer to Pakistan. During his visit to New Delhi in October 1974, Henry Kissinger described India as the preeminent

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power in the region. Under Jimmy Carter in 1977 the US was pressurizing Pakistan to drop nuclear program. Zia decided to proceed with the project. The US suspended economic assistance. The cooling of ties with Pakistan paralleled the warming trend in India-US relations. Though the US could not persuade Pakistan on nuclear issue, and the tussle between Pakistan and India regarding nuclear capability remained a critical feature of that era.

With Ronald Reagan as President, high on agenda was forging closer relations with Pakistan. At that time US had started to take more interest in this region because of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and now Pakistan can perform a much important role as US ally in this region.

A brief overview of US policy in this region reflects the US strategies to practice their foreign policy objectives. On the other hand Indian policy makers were following different tactics for long term benefits.

The Classic Principles of Indian Foreign Policy

Jawaharlal Nehru said: 'We have to develop close and direct contacts with the other nations and to cooperate with them in the furtherance of world peace and freedom. We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups aligned against one another which led in the past to two world wars and which may again lead to discuss an even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and denial of freedom any where must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war' (Chandra, 1990: 627). After independence Non-Alignment was the pivotal policy of Indian foreign policy which generated the idea of neutrality during cold war politics. It is well observed analysis that Washington's warm welcome to Nehru was a diplomatic attempt to establish bloc politics relations with the Washington. Nehru intended to reap maximum benefits in exchange of these relations of block politics. In order to detract, New Delhi paid some high priority diplomatic attention to other states. No doubt, remaining non-aligned was an effort to achieve high level of international spectrum and maintenance of diplomatic ties with other states.

Right from inception of India and Pakistan both inherited most controversial Kashmir issue which has ultimately forced Pakistan to join capital bloc. In the prospect of US military and economic relations and influence in the world, it was hoped that Kashmir issue would be resolved in accordance with the strategic benefits of Pakistan. Pakistan's agriculture and industry was dependant on the rivers naturally flowing from Kashmir. In the meanwhile, the Indian Government stated that Pakistan intentionally violated boundaries and interfered in Kashmir by assisting Pathan's involvement in Indian Territory (Kashmir). The UK foreign office made similar assessment in January, 1948: 'Pakistan authorities in NWFP no doubt helped the tribal with respect of supplies and transport and the Pakistani Government did not attempt to stop incursion. They may have known in advance

what was intended but there is no evidence that it occurred on their initiative' (Kux, 2001: 23).

Prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan met US Secretary of State during the session of United Nations General Assembly Session of October 1948 and brought to his notice the problems confronted by Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan was of the view that it was unthinkable that Pakistan could fall a prey of Communism since it (Communism) was against Islam and thus he urged the US to provide economic help to Pakistan and the nation of Middle East as it did for Europe. He highlighted India's hostility towards Pakistan and gave official statement that peace foremost for Pakistan but it had right to defend its sovereignty. Secretary of State was pleased with his commitment towards US and assured him that Kashmir issue will be resolved according to UN willingness. Kashmir was the significant factor apart from others to show inclination towards America. It is well established fact that Pakistan has got positive impression but no clear meanings. The Kashmir dispute remained largely out side the scope of the Cold War. Cold and stern behaviour of Moscow towards Pakistan was a strategic reality. Policy pattern was shifted when in January, 1952 Jacob Malik, Soviet representative to the United Nations charged that 'the west intended to transform Kashmir and Pakistan into a military springboard against USSR and China' (FRUS, 1952-1954: 1240-41).

The tilt of Pakistani policy makers has always been towards Washington in order to get more diplomatic support for the Kashmir cause but Washington was intentionally not ready to provide any support for this cause. Communism was obviously not the problem of Pakistan but it was in American camp due to its inherited economic and military problems. Owing to New Delhi's neutral diplomacy, American attitude was not much in support of Pakistan. Nimitz resignation from the responsibility of holding plebiscite in the valley was the first jolt for the Pakistani policy makers. He said: 'No mediation effort in Kashmir is going to succeed as long as Mr. Nehru remains his present unstatesman like attitude.'(Kux: 41) On this event, British office informed to the States Department South Asia Director Donald Kennedy that the 'Kashmir remained the main barrier-until this question was out of the way, little could be done to bring Pakistan into the Western Alliance(Kux: 47).

In an attempt to join Western Camp, Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO yet it remained unsuccessful to attain US attention on Kashmir cause. On the other hand India kept its foreign policy open and non-aligned without tilting towards any single super power. Communist ideology whether it was the Moscow issue or not it was always treated as opposite notion to the ideology of Pakistan by the Kashmiri officials. S.M. Burke stated in his book entitled, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis*: 'However, Pakistan was once again told by her Western friends that she would not get from the alliance what she was needed most, i.e., protection from India. When the US joined the military committee of the communist menace and carries no connotations with respect to intra-area matters. British Defense Minister Duncan Sandys declared that both Britain and

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America had promised to defend the Baghdad Pact region against Communist aggression only (Burke, 1990: 152).

Indian policy makers focused on their internal problems, potentials, and challenges while formulating their foreign policy and refused the idea of 'one way treat.' According to the Indian analysts, Nehru reflected a national decision making and leadership attitude at that time. He brought forward nation's consensus on defining national interests and foreign policy objectives and made up the mind of the nation to base a unified nation state based on secularism and democracy that could finally play a significant role in world political scenario. Indian government treated both China and Soviet Union as valuable members of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Nehru considered West's imperialism as the legacy of colonialism, so he kept Soviet Union as a weightage state. India has shown its concerns over the presence of Washington in the region. At the same time it advocated the idea of Pushtunistan by the Kabul government. India has always attempted to encircle Pakistan without joining block politics.

Developments in Cold War Era in Indo-US Relations

Indian foreign policy has impressively explored the world changing environment through multifaceted diplomatic tools.

The Gulf Region

Washington has an enormous influence in the Gulf States and it has always supported Israel, in the perspective of this reality India has adopted time oriented thinking. It was impossible to ignore rich oil Muslim Gulf States. India did not recognize Israel and it established bilateral relations with the Gulf States. The core objective of the Indian foreign policy has always been to 'engage' instead of 'isolation' or 'opposition'. Internally India has satisfied its Muslim population through its policies on Israel-Palestine conflict. The Indian analyst argued that multi-faceted diplomacy is the required feature to meet those challenges, attached with growing economy and uncertain regional circumstances including internal problems especially in context of Kashmir.

Relations with China

India has always followed the policy of balance of interests with different states in order to restore a decisive role at regional and global level. China is the nuclear state in the neighborhood of India having a boundary conflict with bitter experience of war. So India followed nuclear foreign policy to balance the opportunities and challenges within regional political matters. India has never

agreed to the Pakistan's idea of making South Asia a nuclear free zone; it has always followed its intensified nuclear objectives. India explored its nuclear weapon in 1974 and officially declared nuclear doctrine for peaceful purpose instead of having malicious plans. Pak-China cordial relations and American efforts to maintain secret ties with China were viewed with concern by Indian policy makers. India was well aware of US efforts to counter Communism but close Pak-China ties and Chinese concerns over the Kashmir conflict were serious security concerns for India. Indian defense analyst argue that China was the bigger factor behind the Indian nuclear program as it was very much necessary to neutralize the competing nuclear power in the region. US hold the same view and these common strategies were evolved to extract each other from balancing a multidimensional thinking.

India Afghan Policy

Despite these commonalities US government could not win Indian support on the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. India should condemn Soviet invasion through NAM forum, yet it remained aloof from all these developments. Even after facing lot of criticism at NAM forum it never referred Soviet Union directly, it talked generally itself giving a dressing down to the Soviet Ambassador in New Delhi. According to an Indian official source, 'if India did not take pro-Soviet line, America would ignore them (Matinuddin, 1991: 112)'. Berjesh Misra Chandra said that the Soviet position in Afghanistan should be examined in the line of action of those unidentified resources which were involved in assisting rebels from financial, military, and logistical points of view. Further, he said that Afghanistan invited Soviet forces so it all happened (Misra, 1981: 78). Indian stance changed when Washington-Islamabad strategic relationship established and its Minister of External Affairs Narsimah Rao stated: 'It is time to ask ourselves this Afghanistan has not become or is not likely to become a pretext for those who wish to create further instability in that country(Matinuddin: 112)'. During official visit to Washington Rajiv Gandhi in June, 1985 stated: 'The Soviets were invited to Afghanistan (Matinuddin: 113)'. On being questioned on the hypocrisy of India's stand on Afghanistan he replied that perhaps they should define intervention for him referring of course to Grenada.

Indian government adopted two track policies on Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. It pursued to meet ground political realities of the region rather than bothering Soviet presence in Afghanistan. At the same time Pakistan's nuclear program was progressing and Washington was tilted towards Pakistan. Mutual collaboration of CIA and ISI left no space for India to remain aloof from all developments taking place in the region. That is why analyst are of the view that India could not follow hard and fast rules of NAM during Cold War era as the global political realities of bipolar world were more demanding and pressing. So

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it has to deal certain issues by keeping ideologies aside. The same capacity level of diplomacy can be observed in the President Nixon's speech when he said that: 'After a period of confrontation, we are entering in an era of negotiations, let all nations know that during this administration our line of communication will be open. We seek an open world- open to ideas, open to exchange of goods and people, a world in which no people great or small will live in angry isolation. We cannot expect to make every one our friend but we can try to make no one our enemy (Green, 1990: 81)'.

During cold war, Indian foreign policy kept the balance of interest intact by virtue of strong institutions and maintains weightage of superpower with the same astuteness. As far as Afghanistan issue was concerned, India kept its policy impartial. In February 1981, India approached Soviet- Afghanistan problem as a regional problem of South Asia as compared to Islamabad which held this issue with a specific reference. India never conditioned its statement on Afghanistan with Soviet withdrawal (Grare, 2003: 53). Official statement of NAM forum regarding Afghan issue was a diplomatic failure of India when it stated that, 'a political settlement on the basis of withdrawal of foreign troops, full respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-aligned status of Afghanistan and strict observance of the principles of non-intervention and non-interference (Khan, 1991: 20)'.

India –US relation in Post Cold War Era

Soviet Union disintegrated ultimately due to the military stalemate, political, economic, and military costs of its global projects. These changing global political realities paved the way for stronger ties between New Delhi and America. India had foreseen this earlier but it was not ready to accept it at the cost of its friendship with the Soviet Union. India has treated Russia as the Superpower diplomatically but it is also obvious that it has recognized the state of Israel as well. During 1950s and 1960s India's relations with the US were not that decisive but in 1970s it virtually turned towards Soviet Union in order to exert pressure on the later to do efforts to realize pressure as a whole in South Asian politics (Khan: 21). It was the phase of unsatisfactory bargain between New Delhi and Washington but after the disintegration of USSR, America joined India as its strategic partner to counter China which was declared by the US State Department as a 'strategic competitor (Rafique, 2003: 16-17).'

Indian shifting policy feature towards the Muslim Gulf States came forth with the recognition of Israel. It was certainly difficult to access new technology and new resources for meeting new challenges. Still the Gulf War I (Iraq-Kuwait) reflected the period of transitional world politics which introduced New World Order in sustaining credibility of American global hegemonic status at entire global level. This transitional phase has opened up new options on foreign policy

issues. Indian policy makers observed this transformation from bipolarity to unipolarity in the light of examining Kashmir issue, nuclear non-proliferation, China as a growing regional power, Pakistan's presence in the Afghanistan and the New World Order.

It is a solid reality that India that will now look up to Washington but it not let this reality to dominate the basic principle of its foreign policy. After the disintegration of USSR, ice started to melt between New Delhi and Afghanistan. India joined mostly those groups who were with Iran, Moscow and anti-Islamabad elements. It was apparent that after Najib Ullah's administration Afghanistan would not be remained cut out from Afghanistan scene. According to Satish Chandra (Indian High commissioner) in Islamabad: "Dr. Najib Ullah was acceptable to royalists, communist, all ethnic groups, and the Afghan alike and he was amenable to suggestions" (Matinuddin, 1999: 179). It is noteworthy that reason of the acceptance of Najib Ullah was that of his role as a bridge between New Delhi and Moscow.

It is significant to be noted here that some of the former Afghan Mujahideen were pro-Indian, Washington and New Delhi examined ground realities in their own national interest perspectives. It was reported that 'Indian Cargo Planes landed on the 15th, 16th, and 27th June, 1995 with two or three aircraft landing on each occasion (Frontier Post, July 12, 1995)'. India wanted to intensify the opposition of Rabbani government against Taliban organization while Washington was looking forward its approach towards pipeline projects derived from Central Asian States to Afghanistan and then leading to entire Asia and Europe. A specific US company 'UNOCAL' was hopeful that peace and stability in Afghanistan would instate US economically and strategically a global power. While pursuing Afghan policy Pakistan was looking for a strategic depth and access to Central Asian States market. Indian policy objective was to highlight Taliban's policies based on extremism, sectarianism and separatism in the light of security threat to the region. It was short sighted policy from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and UAE to recognize Taliban regime while OIC seat of Afghanistan was still vacant (Matinuddin, 1999:180).

Both India and Washington had a greater similarity and understanding on Afghan policy as both were determined to follow their own interests in the territory. The situation turned in favour of Indian government when America-Pakistan-Taliban 'heydays' were over and Brajesh Mishra addressing to American Jewish Committee said: 'India-US-Israel Axis in established form the need of hour. India-US-Israel all are facing the common threat of modern day Terrorism and hence should form an alliance that will have political will and moral authority to take bold actions in extreme cases of terrorist provocation.' Furthermore, he added that 'such an alliance would not get lodge down in definitional and casual arguments about terrorism.' According to him 'the United States and Israel have some fundamental similarities and stronger India-US relations and India-Israel relations therefore have a natural logic (Bhattacharya, 2003)'.

While US-Taliban collaboration was going on, India adopted 'distant pro-US' policy. When this collaboration ended up in hostility, spectrum of locating common interests was also changed (Bhattacharya, 2003). India took advantage of the situation and strived to link Taliban's terrorism with the Kashmiri Mujahideen freedom movement. Secondly, India tried to marginalize Pakistan by offering US its soil to eliminate terrorist network. India was regarded as strategic partner by President Bush and Kashmir issue was intended to be resolved by developing mutual understanding between India and Pakistan. India had no tensions over the role of America in resolving Kashmir dispute. US-India relations have reached the pinnacle while role of Pakistan is limited to mere war on terror as a frontline state.

US have established civil nuclear deal with India while Pakistan is settled at Non-NATO member status. It is also worth mentioning that US has signed Agreement 123 with India as well (Tellis, 2005: 12). India prepared to separate its civil program from the nuclear program where US had to change its congressional laws by doing amendments. In response to Pakistan's concerns over civil nuclear deal between India and USA Richard Boucher stated: 'Our energy dialogue with Pakistan is going to be different than our energy discussion with India. One should not expect that (Pakistan's) energy needs would be met the same way given different geography, different history, and different resource base (Khan, 2007: 17)'. The US Energy Secretary Samuel Bondom stated strategic partnership with Pakistan does not include discussion on Civil Nuclear Energy. It was not at all subject of my discussion with Pakistani authorities. India-US deal is being discussed in different shades by different schools of thought. Some consider it as 'Good bye Mr. Nehru' while other are resolute that India is in need of such deal in the perspective of growing economic and security needs in the region and in global politics but India must have capability to maintain its sovereignty and its regional bilateral and trilateral relations. India has approved the presence of America in the region but on its long term presence it has same reservations as China, Russia and Iran are having in their own capacity as it can further complicate the security situation in the region (Schdeva, 2006: 27).

Amid the entire scenario, India has intended to resolve its boundary issues with China and opened Sikkim China-India border for trading purpose. Another step in favour of Washington was ruling out India-Pakistan-Iran (IPI) gas pipeline project but at the same time it recognized the right of Iran to develop its nuclear program. India has favoured diplomatically idea of dialogue for Tehran and Afghanistan issue instead of ethnic political environment. Side by side India has never let go any opportunity to highlight Muslim militancy in Central Asian states and their threat to national security. That is why it has joined its sentiments with the US on the issue of terrorist network on Afghanistan soil and it is of the view that peace would be a myth unless they are completely removed or defeated. The idea of military operation is endorsed by both international media and community. They have also shown serious reservations on Pakistan's nuclear program. While Pakistan's stance is that they are already playing the role of frontline state in the

war on terror and they are paying the price of this war and operation 'Rah-i-Rast' which is so far successful in breaking the vital links of the terrorist network.

In this perspective Subhash Kapila's view are worth mentioning, he is of the view that, 'Foreign Policy of any nation does not function in vacuum. It is a product of the prevailing international environment and country's insides in term of its geo-strategic location, economic health, military strength, and economic stability (Kapila, 2005)'. If Indian foreign policy is described in brief, it is an attempt of normalizing and enlarging on one hand and engagement and to look for alternate is on the other hand. Currently it is facing challenge of walking along with the Washington with its hard and fast rules and demands and sustaining internal and external pressures at the same place.

Russia has been a pivotal factor in the military capability of India along with a deep strategic understanding since 1960s. Secondly India has also been a huge market for the Russian goods. Same trade realities are being realized with China with whom India has extended its trade near ten billion dollars per annum. Border issues between two states are also on negotiation tables. Joint military exercises of both India and China are also favoring Indians. It is also observed that furthering of US-India relations has slowed down the dialogue process between India and China. China has enlarged its trade circle towards Central Asia, South Asia and East Asia and has provided assistance to Pakistan on Gawader project. India is keen about these developments and along with its relations with US, it is well aware of the value of Euro in international Affairs. On Pakistan's nuclear capability it has uniform sentiments with the Israel and both consider Pakistan's nuclear program as a continuous threat and in this perspective they are resolute to enhance further military and civil relations.

New Trends in US-Indian Relationship

The re-energized India US relations are a critical area for strategic analyst. Both are looking towards each other as friends and potential partners in strategic, economic and military fields. US Policy is to serve its vital interest by facilitating India's emergence as global power. The factors like poverty, inequality and terrorism, internal and external threats are forcing the states to opt and the comprehensive security approach to meet these challenges.

In March 2005, US-India relations entered into a new a more meaningful phase when, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited India and provided an opportunity to jump and start the process. She answered to one of her interlocutor's question in the words, "It really is emblematic of how for this relationship has come in last several years. The president very much values the enhanced relationship between the United States and India the fact that we are becoming in many ways important global partners as well as regional partner. And he wanted me very much to come here first". She asserted, "We've tied very hand

as a matter of fact to make the point that this is not a hyphenated relationship,” (Tellis, 2005: 15).

But she didn't forget to realize the importance of Pakistan in global political scenario and said, “This is our relationship with India but we also have very good relationship with Pakistan and we are concerned about well-being of both” (Tellis: 16). On the question of India's permanent membership of UN Security Council, US hesitated for long to support. In spite of their very warm relations and India's growing demand of support, US somehow managed to satisfy India and delay its favour (But finally US have showed its support for India in 2010, but the question of veto power is still unanswered).

The strategic dialogue between US and India is taking place since 2001. This is another most important avenue of US-India relations. It is helping to strengthen the relations which are more specifically and dimensionally moving forward. New Delhi has managed to emerge as “New Asia Partner” of the United States-US needs India as an Asian power to influence the new strategic design. President Bush's visit to India in March 2006, gave new dimension to these bilateral ties. The spectrum of these relationships has spread to strategic, economic, technological and military areas. The diplomatic and strategic support to India by US is increasing with growing developments at global political arena. These relationships are based on mutual benefits of both states (Dormandy, 2007: 4-7).

Apart from strategic gain, the economic ties have far reaching consequences for both the states. Adopting different approach from his predecessors, President Bush deeply desired to transform the relations and to enter into a new and wide ranged phase of multifaceted relations.

Owing to the growing strategic relations of the world and hot theater of Afghanistan, US cannot afford to leave Pakistan and is inclined to sustain its relationships with Pakistan in a more dimensional way and with suitable pace. When in March 2005, after month of secret deliberation, President Bush finally phoned PM Singh and informed him personally that US would end the fifteen year hiatus in sale of F-16 fighter aircrafts to Pakistan, Mr. Singh according to spokesman conveyed his great disappointment on the decision, which could have negative consequences for India's Security environment (Perkovich, 2005).

President Barak Obama visited India in November, 2010. Indian media planned out the priority list of Indian expectations from American President. The main areas of what India wants as discussed in Hindustan Times are;

1. Greater salience in the strategic ties with US, taking it to the next level
2. ending the high-technology export control and taking off Indian firms from the US entities list, transfer of dual-use technology
3. US should acknowledge larger Indian role in UN
4. Greater role for India in Afghanistan, addressing India's concerns over the Taliban integration process ensuring its not a Pakistan- driven process
5. Joint efforts for Africa
6. Greater access for Indian goods, services in Indian market

7. Positive signs on outsourcing
8. Greater cooperation in space initiatives, monsoon, crop prediction
9. Greater cooperation in health and education
10. Greater cooperation in East Asia region
11. Greater counter-terrorism cooperation
12. Indian wants US to back it in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australian Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement' (Hindustan Times, Friday, 19 November, 2010).

Indian expectations worked. US President came India with a confidence that US and India are going to be one of the defining partnership of 21st century. This perception is based on the increasing cooperation between the two countries after the end of cold war .The shared goals between the two states were discussed with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his visit to US in November 2009.The joint statement issued at the end of the visit laid emphasis on cooperation in trade and investment, space, high-end-technology, counter-terrorism and in many other important areas. Another important factor is a large number of Indian community which is almost 2.7 million strong, and a large number of Indian Americans occupy high-level posts in the US federal government and private sector which augurs for bilateral relations .The economic ties between the two countries have also become stronger. In 2009, India was America's 14th largest trade partner for goods, accounting for \$37.6 billion in trade. Defense relations also increased underpinned by the New Frame work for India-US Defense Relationship signed in June 2005 .Another India-US Frame work for Maritime Security Cooperation signed in March 2009. The joint military exercise in October 2009 saw the largest US Stryker which deployed outside Iraq and Afghanistan.

A Few Stumbling Blocks

There are some stumbling blocks between the ties.

- Afghanistan factor is critical, because India and US still not definite about the role of Taliban in coming future.

Afghanistan is strategically very important for India now as it is a gateway to energy rich Central Asian States. According to J. Alexander Their, an expert on Afghanistan at United States Institute of Peace (USIP), "India is looking to ensure that other countries in the region favour or at least are neutral over the conflict with Pakistan," On the other hand focused India as a potential counterweight for Afghanistan in its relations with Pakistan. Since 2001, India has offered \$450 Million for Afghanistan's reconstruction making it the limpest regional donor (Kronstadt, 2007: 10-11). In August 2008, India pledged an additional \$450 Million. Economic expansion can be the key element of India's security strategy in Afghanistan .India has built Zaranj-Delaram highway to Iran border which would

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enable access to the sea. A major dilemma for the US is to reconcile the conflicting security interest of India and Pakistan in Afghanistan in the region.

- Another issue the policy towards Iran. India needs Iran for energy requirements and to access into Afghanistan. Another perception is to counter Pakistan in Muslim world, having good relations with Iran is important to India. US has reservations on Iranian nuclear programme and its offensive diplomacy against Israel.
- US is not in a position to repeat its mistake to ignore Pakistan, as they did after Soviet withdrawal. The dilemma of keeping balance between these two rivals is debatable. Today, a very few places on Earth are as important to US as the tribal belt along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. Afghanistan holds a very strategic value for Pakistan. From this perspective, Islamabad is inclined to seek friendly regime in Kabul. Pakistan has reservations on Indian involvement in Afghanistan and its increasing engagement with the passage of time.
- Although two countries are not ready to admit their concerns about the rise of China, not only in Asia but also at global level. Many Indians take much realist approach to view China as an external balancer in the South Asian subsystem. The support for Islamabad by Beijing is taken as an attempt to challenge the aspiring regional hegemony of a more powerful India (Kronstadt: 9-10). To opt more rational approach to handle this sensitive issue is much required.

Conclusion

India is emerging as new major global power. This reality is transferring the geopolitical landscape. Now, in the light of this fact, US-India relationships enter into a new phase. Now, US is inclined to strengthen its ties with India owing to India's emerging strength and significance in contemporary world. Before President Obama's visit to India in Nov-10, former undersecretary of state Nicholas Burns said "President Obama has an important opportunity to re-energize the relationship. We have a vital American interest to sustain this partnership, to build it, and to sustain it for decades ahead. India may not be a formal treaty ally, although some American would object if India wasted a formal alliance. But it is going to be a democratic partner for us for the future" (Washington Post, November 11, 2010).

But under the present circumstance, US also need Pakistan as President Obama admitted this fact during his visit to India in Nov-10, in the words, "Pakistan is strategically important for the world". US will consider these stumbling blocks while mapping new geo political landscape in South Asia.

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Biographical Note

Dr. Iram Khalid is working as Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore

Since India's independence, ties with the United States have weathered Cold War-era distrust and estrangement over India's nuclear program. Relations have warmed in recent years and cooperation has strengthened across a range of economic and political areas. Since India's independence, ties with the United States have weathered Cold War-era distrust and estrangement over India's nuclear program. Relations have warmed in recent years and cooperation has strengthened across a range of economic and political areas. Start. 1947. During my discussions with (the) Indian leadership here, we were energised and re-energised, that the leadership here is supportive of the efforts of the people of Afghanistan for achieving peace, dignified, durable, sustainable peace. <https://images.indianexpress.com/2020/08/1x1.png>. He said, "The principle that you have laid the foundation of your foreign policy towards the future of our country - Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-controlled, is welcomed by our people." In his virtual address to the inaugural ceremony of the Intra-Afghan negotiations in Doha, Jaishankar had expressed his India's economy has seen its economic growth rate slow over the past few quarters. Earlier this year, it lowered its growth forecast to 5% for the year to 31 March 2013, underlining the challenges it faces in reviving the sluggish economy. There are concerns that the country's growth may be running out of steam and there have been calls for a fresh wave of economic reforms. Raghuram Rajan, the Indian government's chief economic advisor told the BBC that the government is taking steps to re-energise growth in the country.