

THE "CANADIAN COROLLARY" TO THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE OGDENSBURG AGREEMENT OF 1940

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An understanding or even an alliance [between the United States and Canada] may indeed be necessary for the preservation of that North American civilization which is our joint possession.

John W. Dafoe
Editor, the *Winnipeg Free Press*
in a lecture at Columbia University, 1934.¹

Very few people in the 1930s could have grasped the significance of John Dafoe's words. Indeed, he would have been surprised to learn of the coming intimacy in Canadian-American relations, not only during World War II but also in the years to follow. He would have been amazed at the wartime understanding which continued into the post-war years, and at the principal forum of that *entente*, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD).

On the matter of a Canadian-American "understanding," if on nothing else, Dafoe and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had begun to think much alike by 1934. Roosevelt, then in the midst of protracted negotiations with London and Tokyo over a new naval limitations agreement, privately warned British leaders that should they prefer collaboration with Japan to the United States he would "be compelled in the interests of American security, to approach public sentiment in Canada" and the other Dominions to make them "understand clearly that their future security is linked with us in the United States." In any case, Roosevelt needed to embark on an extensive naval building programme² and to forge new defensive links with Canada. The enlargement of the navy and the approach of war would necessitate closer Canadian-American cooperation.

Roosevelt had always demonstrated a great personal interest in the navy and its problems.³ That concern led him during a 1936 Caribbean cruise to consider acquiring air and naval bases on British territory in Bermuda, the Caribbean and Newfoundland to protect the American continent and to prevent those areas from falling into an enemy's hands.⁴ Defence of the western hemisphere's northern areas was a growing concern to Roosevelt, and in an attempt to arouse Americans to the dangers of war, he quite noticeably began to make references to Canadian security. On August 14, 1936, during an address at Chautauqua, New York, he said that "our closest neighbors are good neighbors. If there are remoter nations that wish

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us not good but ill, they know that we are strong. They know that we can and will defend ourselves and defend our neighborhood."⁵ This unilateral declaration prepared the ground for discussions between the President and Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King; yet at the time Roosevelt's statement received little attention, even in Canada.⁶

King and Roosevelt first discussed Atlantic and Pacific coast defence in March 1937 when King was an overnight guest at the White House.⁷ It was Roosevelt's visit to British Columbia the following September, however, which sparked his interest in a Canadian-American continental defence effort. He crossed from Seattle on board a U.S. destroyer to meet the Lieutenant-Governor and B.C. Premier T.D. Pattullo. The meagre condition of Canada's Pacific naval forces and coastal defence disturbed Roosevelt. It was United States' defence which dominated his thinking and he considered the British Columbia coast a link between the United States and Alaska.⁸ Shortly after returning from Victoria, Roosevelt suggested that some means be sought to exchange military intelligence between the two nations' General Staffs. This initiative led to the first contacts between Department of National Defence and War Department officials in Washington during January 1938.⁹ Staff officers reviewed general security problems, but defence in the Strait of Juan de Fuca received special attention and they exchanged information on the west coast area.¹⁰

On August 18, 1938, just before the Czechoslovak crisis, Roosevelt visited Kingston, Ontario to accept an honorary degree at Queen's University and to attend the dedication of the Thousand Islands Bridge at Ivy Lea. While there, Roosevelt met with King for discussions which focused primarily on Atlantic coast defence. The President, in the course of delivering the convocation address, defined America's strategic obligations to Canada. He declared, "I give you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire."¹¹ Roosevelt thus reaffirmed the assurances he had offered two years earlier.¹² Given the traditional American opposition to any foreign involvement (except in Latin America),¹³ this address marked a significant departure in U.S. policy. After all, Roosevelt led an electorate accustomed to very limited interventionist sorties.¹⁴ This time, instead of being largely ignored, FDR's new pronouncement received acclaim in both the United States and Canada as a revived and updated version of the Monroe Doctrine,¹⁵ although Roosevelt insisted at a press conference the next day that he intended no enlargement of Monroe's principles. Canada, he stated with some exaggeration, had never been excluded from the American States to which President James Monroe had referred in his 1823 message.¹⁶ "What I said at Queen's University," Roosevelt explained confidentially in a letter to Governor-General Lord Tweedsmuir "was so obvious that I cannot understand why some American President did not say it half a century ago."¹⁷ Regardless of Roosevelt's historical accuracy in interpreting Monroe's address, he had begun to define America's strategic expectations vis-a-vis Canada and to explain publicly what he had suggested privately in 1934: that Canadians must understand that their security was increasingly linked with that of the United States.

King acknowledged Roosevelt's declaration two days later during an address at Woodbridge, Ontario, in which he stated,

we, too, have our obligations as a good and friendly neighbour, and one of them is to see that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that should the

occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air to the United States across Canadian territory.¹⁸

King thought his speech had sounded the proper note. It would, he confided to his diary, "please the Americans above all else, and it is right." It pleased King, too, that he had been able to spell out Canada's strategic obligations to the Americans. Canada, he believed, had at last got its "defence programme in good shape. Good neighbour on one side; partners within the Empire on the other. Obligations to both in return for their assistance. Readiness to meet all joint emergencies."¹⁹

King appeared curiously complacent at a moment when Canada's defence posture remained incredibly weak and "military liaison with the United States was in the earliest and most elementary state." Canada faced an imminent danger of war after Munich but "possessed little in the way of means" to defend her interests or to meet an emergency.²⁰ Nevertheless, these two public declarations marked the first instance of Canadian recognition and American affirmation of obligations and expectations in continental defence. Indeed, the Roosevelt-King statements of 1938 still stand as the clearest and most sweeping pronouncement of Canadian-American bilateral defence commitments.

In the wake of Roosevelt's visit to Canada, and at his suggestion, the State Department proposed further secret staff talks; thus, the new Chief of the Canadian General Staff, Major-General T. V. Anderson, met in Washington with the U.S. Army Chief, General Malin Craig, during November 1938.²¹ King also traveled to Washington during mid-November to sign the new Canadian-American trade agreements,²² at which time he and Roosevelt discussed common defence problems "at length and in a more concrete and definitive way."²³ This meeting followed by only a few days Roosevelt's statement that the United States intended to defend the American continent from air attack and that he believed Canada would join in furthering a defence scheme to this end.²⁴ King observed following FDR's announcement that this speech forced him to be "particularly guarded not to say a word that might be construed as failure to appreciate a generous attitude by the President. On the other hand, his remarks will be interpreted, in some quarters, as an effort to isolate North America. Jingos [sic] will wish to assert solidarity of British Empire."²⁵ They did not have long to wait to see what Canadian participation in hemispheric defence might entail. The American press had already begun painting that picture in bold colours.

Just prior to King's Washington trip the press began to publicize the idea that the United States should obtain island air and naval facilities in the Atlantic and Caribbean, and to call attention to Canada's vital role in American security. There is reason to suspect that Roosevelt and Naval Operations Chief William Leahy encouraged that publicity to focus public attention on the United States' foreign base requirements. In its October 31 issue, for example, *Life* contained an article by retired Army Major George Fielding Eliot entitled "America Gets Ready to Fight Germany, Italy and Japan." The editor also called attention to Eliot's forthcoming book, *The Ramparts We Watch: A Study of the Problems of American National Defense*, in which the author contended that America's security depended not only upon military strength at home but also on an adequate defence of Canada, Bermuda and foreign possessions in the Caribbean. Two weeks later, New York *Herald Tribune* journalist Walter Lippmann elaborated on *Life's* article in his syndicated column.²⁶ A factor which makes these articles and the book so intriguing is that Lippmann had visited Leahy's office

some months earlier to obtain information for an article on naval matters,²⁷ and Eliot enjoyed similar access to data for his lectures and publications on national defence.²⁸ What role, if any, Roosevelt and Leahy played in leaking these ideas to Lippmann and Eliot is a matter of conjecture. It is known, however, that Roosevelt began to assemble a temporary Atlantic cruiser squadron late in August 1938. This squadron was to be composed of ships then in Atlantic waters or near completion in naval yards and would visit American ports and prepare for forthcoming winter maneuvers,²⁹ an activity suited perfectly to the proposals Eliot and Lippman had been trying out in the press.

Roosevelt envisaged a patrol scheme for defence of the Atlantic coast which provided the concept behind those winter naval exercises. In mid-February 1939 he boarded a destroyer and participated in a two-week naval "battle" off the shores of the Windward Islands. That exercise convinced the President and naval authorities that to make the patrol efficient, the United States required the use of foreign-owned bases.³⁰ Returning from the Caribbean, the President quietly began to select base sites to support his patrol. On March 23, Leahy and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles conferred with Roosevelt on requirements for island air fueling facilities, and the President directed Leahy to advise Welles on desirable locations.³¹ Leahy found little difficulty complying with that directive. U.S. naval officials had for several years cast covetous eyes toward British Empire and other foreign territories in the Atlantic and Caribbean, observing that "trends in aviation, both military and commercial, have increased the importance of acquiring certain neighboring foreign possessions."³² Lists of desirable locations had long since been considered, so on the following day Leahy sent a list to Welles which included Trinidad, as well as St. John's, Newfoundland; Halifax, Nova Scotia; Bermuda; St. Lucia and other British and Australian Pacific island possessions.³³

Roosevelt advanced his plan further by exploring with King George VI the possibility of acquiring British and Canadian base facilities when the King and Queen visited the United States in June 1939.³⁴ After entertaining their Majesties at the White House, FDR invited them to spend a weekend at Hyde Park. Mackenzie King accompanied the monarch and was privy to most, though not all, of his discussions with Roosevelt.³⁵ The host kept the King up late Saturday night, June 10, discussing the international situation. The President spoke of the possibility of war³⁶ and said that he "had a perfect right to keep other European countries from sending warships into waters off the coasts of America, whether it was north or south." He thought that "even in time of war," should it come between Germany and England, the United States could, "without violating any neutral rights," come into Halifax for coal and equipment. "If we could assist his vessels there," he told the King and the Canadian Prime Minister, "he could assist in keeping the waters of the Atlantic free of German ships of war."³⁷ Roosevelt held a second conversation alone with the King the following afternoon during which FDR showed him U.S. naval patrol plans in greater detail and explained that if war broke out, the Americans needed bases at Trinidad and Bermuda for the fleet to fuel and replenish stores.³⁸

The President did not pigeonhole the idea of acquiring bases following the Royal visit as has been suggested.³⁹ On the contrary, he very quickly approached the U.K. government about the plan. Late in the afternoon of June 30, 1939, FDR called British Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay to the White House⁴⁰ and explained that to make a wartime patrol efficient, the United States required foreign bases. The Americans wanted bases in Brazil, but in addition Roosevelt said he needed four bases in British territory: in Trinidad, St. Lucia,

Bermuda and Halifax.⁴¹ It was important, he emphasized, that an agreement under which facilities would be accorded should be finalized during peacetime, so that American wartime use of these bases might continue without too severe a break with neutrality. Of the three southern islands Trinidad and Bermuda were most important. The fourth base at Halifax ranked in a different category. American authorities planned to ask Ottawa about access to facilities there, but only if Great Britain first assented to occupation of the other three bases. There was some talk of including Newfoundland in the scheme, but that suggestion arose as an afterthought in the discussions and Lindsay left the White House unsure just how seriously the Americans submitted that proposal.⁴² A few days later he enquired of Welles whether the United States needed a base in Newfoundland. Welles said definitely not at present, but the idea might perhaps be taken up later when dealing with the base at Halifax.⁴³

It took less than a week for the British to agree to American use of whatever colonial bases it might require for its western Atlantic patrol.⁴⁴ During that week Roosevelt volunteered some further hints of his intent. His comments paralleled his earlier statements following the Kingston address. The limits of the patrol area could not be defined until the moment arrived, but it might stretch down the entire west side of the Atlantic. Roosevelt explained that his defence plan involved the Monroe Doctrine and that the American government intended to interpret it to encompass not only Canada and Newfoundland but also all other British possessions and those of France and Holland within the area as well.⁴⁵

By July 7, the British Foreign Office thought it might be necessary "to give the Canadian Government some inkling now of the proposed plan."⁴⁶ Accordingly, the Dominions Office instructed the British High Commissioner in Ottawa to inform King "orally and most secretly" of the American plan and Britain's reply to it. London wanted Ottawa to concert its reply with them since they attached great importance to Halifax's position relative to Britain's convoy assembly plans and protection of wartime trade routes.⁴⁷

Stephen Holmes of the High Commissioner's Office met King at Laurier House on July 15. King, understandably, seemed little surprised at Holmes' report that FDR had approached the British Ambassador regarding his patrol and requested permission to keep stores at Trinidad, St. Lucia and Bermuda. The President, Holmes said, "would like to use these bases to fuel, leave repairs, and supplies." Britain had agreed to this request but was concerned about Canada's attitude should a similar question be raised about Halifax. Holmes stressed the importance Britain attached to Halifax and warned that the matter would "shortly" be brought to Canada's attention "formally or officially."

King brought Holmes up a bit short with the reply that he had already discussed the matter with the President and gathered that Roosevelt "wanted more than to keep his own supplies or stores" but also "may want some of ours if need be." Furthermore, he said, Canada was quite willing to allow the Americans to use the facilities at Halifax: "It all depended on developments. If [the] U.S. were prepared to engage in or risk war by coming into our ports for fuel and to help their patrol-thus disregarding neutrality and exposing themselves to convoy attacks if we were at war-that was their own doing and business. We should not object to getting all the help we could."⁴⁸ It seems apparent that the ties which bound Canada more closely to the United States, and turned her into a "North American nation"⁴⁹ during the war, began to bind rather sooner than has heretofore been presumed.

Early in August Roosevelt arranged with King to take a "holiday" cruise, accompanied by navy patrol planes, aboard the U.S.S. *Tuscaloosa* in waters bordering Nova Scotia, the Gulf of

St. Lawrence, Newfoundland, and Labrador. His real purpose was "not to take a holiday but to see the lie of the land for himself. He wanted to see what naval and air defence of the Canadian East Coast and Newfoundland involved." During the trip Roosevelt entered Halifax harbour for one night and met with commanding air and naval officers. His cruise was cut short when on August 20, news from the State Department gave him a "hunch" that he should turn back toward Halifax from which he could quickly return home in any emergency.⁵⁰

The emergency arrived in short order. The State Department received warning of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact by mid-afternoon, August 21. Washington had details of the agreement on the morning of the 24th,⁵¹ and that afternoon the U.S. Navy Department moved rapidly to exercise its options on British base facilities. American naval officers hastily inspected sites and drafted, backdated and signed leases to acquire land for bases in Bermuda and St. Lucia and aviation installations in Trinidad before war began.⁵² Roosevelt sent no naval officers to lease territory for an American base at Halifax; yet, significantly, the way lay open for American wartime utilization of facilities there whenever the need arose. The United States would have liked to have requested air and naval base construction sites in Newfoundland too, but were afraid of Canadian objection.⁵³

Meanwhile, in Ottawa O.D. Skelton submitted a paper to King on August 24 outlining the forms and objectives of proposed Canadian participation in the war effort. These included a provision to consider extending Canadian aid to Newfoundland and the West Indies. Skelton thought this would assist Britain and have the "goodwill and possibly eventually the cooperation of the United States." King read Skelton's memo at a Cabinet meeting that afternoon and obtained Council approval. He also advised Council of the conversations with the King and the President "on the matter of his patrolling the Atlantic Coast."⁵⁴

C. P. Stacey, in his study of Canada's war policies, *Arms, Men and Governments*, summarized "how far things went" in the Canadian-American relationship before the outbreak of the war. "The cautious establishment of contact, some very friendly general discussions, some exchange of information," occurred, but there "was still no permanent machinery for military liaison, no joint planning."⁵⁵ His summary is on the whole accurate, though "things" had proceeded a trifle further than he claimed. The Canadian government provided an informal arrangement which afforded the U.S. access to Halifax's naval yard facilities. Ottawa also foresaw the possibility of extending defensive assistance to Newfoundland and the West Indies in hopes of encouraging American cooperation in those places. Certainly the Halifax arrangement by itself appears insignificant. Yet it typified the method by which the two countries managed defence responsibilities in the decades ahead, for the U.S.-Canadian defence relationship has after all, been characterized by a "marked absence of comprehensive joint agreements."⁵⁶

When war broke out, the coastal defence question suddenly assumed vital proportions, and the fact that the United States remained neutral while Canada joined the conflict compounded the problem. King pondered how FDR's September 1, 1939, statement that "the U.S. ought to be able to keep out of the European war" could be squared with the President's "promise of defending Canada against any attack." It is usually assumed that the friendship and mutual confidence which abounded between King and Roosevelt served to assuage this complex set of circumstances - an assumption based largely upon King's account of his relationship with the President.⁵⁸ It has been suggested that "neither Roosevelt nor King

seems...to have been exactly a monument of sincerity.¹⁵⁹ That description certainly applied to FDR in their first wartime meeting late in April 1940.

King headed south to Virginia Beach for a holiday following his election victory and sent word via Loring Christie, Canadian Minister in Washington, that "he wanted very much to see the President before returning to Canada on about April 25th." King said that "he would be happy to go to Washington or Warm Springs at the President's convenience." His visit was to be entirely unofficial—"King wanted to be left alone by the State Department—but he did wish to see the President."¹⁶⁰ Roosevelt obliged and invited King to join him at his Little White House at Warm Springs, Georgia.

Contrary to the notion that King "preferred to listen to Roosevelt's views and to draw him out,"¹⁶¹ King did almost all the talking. During the talks, however, the Prime Minister did learn that Roosevelt was greatly alarmed over the deteriorating situation in Europe. Denmark and Norway had just fallen to the German onslaught. Roosevelt "spoke of the possibility of finding it necessary to send destroyers and cruisers to assist the British." He voiced concern about "the inadequacy of the defence of Canada on both the Atlantic and Pacific" as posing "a real danger to the United States." The U.S. Navy had some World War I equipment which might be useful on the Canadian east coast and in Newfoundland and which Roosevelt thought Canada could have for a nominal sum.⁶²

After returning to Washington on April 29, Roosevelt "took a long time" over lunch to tell Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau "how disgusted he was with Mackenzie King. He said that all Mackenzie King would talk to him about at Warm Springs was what a great man he, Mackenzie King, was and how he pulled this trick or that trick to get reelected." Roosevelt said that "it took him two or three days to get Mackenzie King talking about the war."¹⁶³ But Roosevelt wore his "mask of affability"¹⁶⁴ that afternoon when King stopped off at the White House on his way to the train station. King assured Roosevelt that he could "count on" him for help, and then they "exchanged a word or two about the very happy days they had had together at Warm Springs and said goodbye."¹⁶⁵ This was, as one Canadian historian put it quite aptly, "the beginning of a new cooperation between the two countries, which grew more intimate as the situation in Europe went from bad to worse following the launching of the German 'Blitzkrieg' in the West on 10 May."¹⁶⁶ But that "beginning" got off to a far chillier start than historians have surmised.

The President appeared less than sanguine after the Warm Springs conversations about the extent he could actually count on King in checking the Nazi threat to the western hemisphere. In reality King's visit contributed little to the enhancement of either his friendship with FDR or continental defence preparations. Roosevelt's fears over Canadian defence deficiencies and the concomitant dangers they posed to U.S. security increased as the European situation deteriorated. King, for his part, had to call upon the United States for an increasing amount of assistance. The Canadian War Cabinet Committee, following Germany's invasion of France and the Low Countries, decided on May 23 that every available Royal Canadian Navy destroyer should be sent to defend England. (There were but four ready at the time.) King felt that he should immediately inform the United States that Canadian coastal waters had been stripped of naval defences. The War Committee agreed that Canada as a "good neighbor" should let Roosevelt know of the destroyers' departure, since the United States "stood to suffer" if Canadian "shores were wholly neglected."¹⁶⁷

The following day, before King contacted Roosevelt, the President invited the Prime Minister to send a personal envoy to Washington for conversations with him and Secretary of State Cordell Hull. King selected Hugh L. Keenleyside, Counsellor of the Department of External Affairs, who returned to report that Roosevelt intended to extend his "ice patrol" to cover the Atlantic coast from Maine to Greenland and to make available small arms and ammunition, harbour chains and nets, and some old naval planes - though the U.S. could not at the moment supply anti-aircraft equipment.⁶⁸

The government of Canada seems to have just discovered at this point in time that Newfoundland comprised an integral part of its defensive perimeter. On June 14, the day Paris fell, Ottawa decided to send a flight of bomber reconnaissance aircraft and an infantry battalion for defence of the Botwood aerodrome and seaplane base.⁶⁹ C.G. Power, acting Minister of Defence, reported this action to the War Committee. He also recommended, and the Committee agreed, that the question of Canadian-American staff conversations posed a problem of some immediacy.⁷⁰ King met that day as well with Jay Pierrepont Moffat, the newly-appointed American Minister to Canada. The Prime Minister emphasized during their conversation that since France no longer counted as a military force, an attack upon Great Britain seemed all the more imminent. He explained to Moffat that if Britain proved unable to withstand or repel an attack, the British fleet would, in whole or in part, move to Canada. This contingency would pose a multitude of problems which could not be solved without American assistance. King thought the time had arrived to renew staff talks with the United States but wondered whether the suggestion would embarrass the President. He asked Moffat to feel out the situation and tell him Roosevelt's response.⁷¹

The Prime Minister soon received reassuring news concerning staff discussions and American defence plans for Newfoundland and Greenland. A couple of days following his conference with Moffat, the Canadian legation in Washington channeled a secret message to him from his friend Bruce Hutchison, editor of the *Vancouver Sun*. On June 12, Hutchison lunched with the number two man in the Military Intelligence Division (G-2) of the War Department's General Staff who asked to remain unnamed. Hutchison reported that "his statements may be taken as the final opinion of the U.S. experts as submitted to the President." The officer described Canada as "a part of America's "first line of defence." He did not think Hitler would attempt to invade the U.S. but he could "walk across to Canada on the causeway provided by Iceland, Greenland and Newfoundland." Therefore, he said, America needed "a base on Greenland and Newfoundland for planes and ships." He added that "there must be a joint base on Newfoundland," and the United States needed another big base in the West Indies and one in Brazil, with smaller bases in between, "probably one around Halifax." No staff talks had yet been conducted between the U.S. and Canada but, the officer said, they "must be held soon."⁷²

Hutchison sent King a similar report of a June 13 interview with Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Kay Pittman, in which the Senator affirmed that the U.S. "must have a military understanding" with Canada. Washington and Ottawa would, he asserted, agree "on the bases that must be established, [and] the detailed plans of defence." Pittman trotted out a bases "shopping list" similar to the one the G-2 officer had produced and reminiscent of the one FDR had presented the previous summer: the U.S. required bases in Greenland, Newfoundland, and the West Indies and smaller ones in between.⁷³

This news, especially the statement that "Canada was part of America's first line of defence," apparently prompted Keenleyside to warn King that "today, from consideration of her own security and from friendship for Canada, the United States may well become involved in the task of protecting the Dominion from the results of Canadian declarations of war upon major European powers." Washington, he emphasized, "cannot long be expected to be willing to accept responsibility for the results of a policy over which the United States has no control."⁷⁴

King, with that warning and knowledge that Washington was again considering holding staff conversations, pressed the matter further when he met again with Moffat on June 29. He proposed that Moffat meet with Canadian officials to ascertain their views regarding staff talks. Accordingly, Moffat suggested to the Ministers of Defence and Defence for Air that they recommend that high-ranking officers from each country meet and exchange impressions. No commitments on either side would be requested or given.⁷⁵ Consequently, staff discussions began in Washington on July 12. The United States obtained some valuable military information from them, but on the whole the meetings proved inconclusive, and by the end of July they had reached an impasse.⁷⁶ This breakdown in staff talks emphasized not only that regular diplomatic and military channels were inadequate to handle discussion of defence matters but also that there existed no extraordinary structures able to deal with such problems. By so doing, it fostered the creation of a permanent joint defence board.

While Canadian officers were conferring with their American counterparts in Washington, a group of twenty influential Canadians met on July 17-18 to consider whether new problems might develop with the U.S. "unless some means of collaboration on a basis satisfactory to Canada could be established." They concluded that the U.S. in its concern over the "inadequacy of the meager Canadian defences" might and no doubt would act unilaterally "to augment them." They agreed that "Canada would have to cooperate voluntarily and involuntarily." If Canada "unduly emphasized its independence of action, it might provoke the United States to a strong attitude that could threaten loss of Canadian national identity." They resolved that "the best way to prevent such a turn of events would be frankly to admit Canadian inability adequately to protect its air, sea and ground frontiers and to request U.S. cooperation in providing such protection on a continental or perhaps even hemispheric basis."⁷⁷ The conference proved timely because top officials in Washington were then discussing possible U.S. emergency defence action in Canada. FDR had just appointed as Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, a political protege of the late Theodore Roosevelt and a man who, according to Loring Christie, spoke "in the authentic tones of that influential element" in the United States "who have long been aware of their country as a great power."⁷⁸ While musing over the phone on July 18 with Secretary Morgenthau regarding a Canadian request for eighty thousand Enfield rifles, Stimson said, "I'm trying to help out on the opposite side-across the water very much, but from what I hear, what the Canadian situation is, she's stripped herself bare up there so that if anything happens up there we've got to go up and take the burden of it." Morgenthau replied, "That's right, I know all about it. I saw Moffat when he was down here - our Minister."⁷⁹

King had reinitiated staff talks but it was Roosevelt who encouraged further political contacts. Christie advised the Prime Minister on July 13 that Roosevelt's close friend, Justice Felix Frankfurter, had approached him and suggested that King should visit the President at Hyde Park to discuss a "common plan of defence for [the] North American continent includ-

ing Islands on the Atlantic." The scheme might be flexible enough to bring the British government into it.⁸⁰ That day King got word, not unexpectedly, that Washington wished to secure air facilities in the British West Indies and Newfoundland. London asked the Canadian government to comment on the request, and King hastened to assure the British that he favoured the proposal.⁸¹

There is reason to speculate that Roosevelt began to lay plans early in August for a meeting with King, not at Hyde Park, but at some place along the Canadian-American border. On August 3, he asked his assistants to arrange a troop inspection tour which would bring him into either Canton or Ogdensburg, New York by train by 7:00 p.m. on August 17, where he intended to spend the night.⁸² The President's position, as one Canadian observer recalled later, was to wait for public opinion to ferment like a mash, so that he could come along and draw off the strong liquor later. The greater the ferment of ideas, the better. One or more of them might in time become government policy.⁸³ Unquestionably, by mid-August public opinion in Canada and the U.S., thoroughly aroused over events in Europe, had grown fearful for the security of North America. Moffat reported to the State Department on August 14 that even those groups in Canada which had opposed closer relations with the United States were now bringing pressure on the Prime Minister for "some form of joint defense understanding with the United States."⁸⁴

Loring Christie saw the President on the 15th and reported to King that Roosevelt "had been thinking of proposing to you to send to Ottawa" three military, naval and naval air officers to discuss defence problems with their Canadian counterparts. The President had in mind their surveying the "situation from the Bay of Fundy around to the Gulf of St. Lawrence." Further, they might explore the "question of base facilities for United States use," possibly including facilities at Chester or Louisbourg separate from a Halifax base. "The President," Christie said, "would contemplate making available anti-aircraft and other guns, and in certain eventualities despatch destroyers." Roosevelt intimated to Christie that he might, "as soon as the beginning of next week make some definite suggestion" to King,⁸⁵ and "said that he would probably be talking to Mr. King by telephone." The next day Christie sent word to Ottawa that Roosevelt had early that morning informed Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador in Washington, that he hoped to see "Mr. King over the week-end or in the next few days."⁸⁶ So a personal meeting was contemplated.

Moffat's report, written two days before, reached Roosevelt on August 16.⁸⁷ Furthermore, after sending the report, Moffat telephoned Roosevelt and suggested Ogdensburg as a possible meeting place for the President and Prime Minister. Moffat had heard that Roosevelt was planning a trip to upstate New York, and proposed to the President that he meet with King somewhere along the border.⁸⁸ In politics as in the distillery, timing is important; the time had arrived to "draw off the liquor." Roosevelt phoned King at 2:00 that afternoon and said, "I am going tomorrow night in my train to Ogdensburg. If you are free, I would like to have you come over and have dinner with me there." He advised King that he had issued a statement to the press that morning, informing them that he was communicating with Great Britain over Atlantic defences and that he was taking up directly with King "the matter of mutual defences of our coasts on the Atlantic." Roosevelt said that he wished to keep the two matters separate. King agreed. The President went on to explain that he had already taken the liberty of informing the press that the two of them would be meeting. Thereupon he asked:

"Are you free tomorrow night?" King said "Yes," he said, he would be "very pleased to accept the invitation."⁸⁹

All the preliminary arrangements in Ottawa proceeded in strict secrecy. Few men, even in the Department of External Affairs, knew of this planned conference, and those who did remained unaware of the agenda.⁹⁰ The next day King, accompanied by Moffat, drove from Ottawa to Prescott, where they boarded a special ferry which carried them to Ogdensburg. Motorcycles escorted them to the railway yard where the President waited. At 7:00 p.m. King stepped aboard the President's private railway car, in which he and Moffat found Roosevelt relaxing in the observation room with his Secretary of War, Colonel Stimson. The President had just returned from inspecting troops, and although physically tired, he appeared to be in an expansive mood. In particular, Roosevelt was amused at "stealing half the show" from Wendell Willkie (who that day had delivered his acceptance speech for the Republican presidential nomination) by his visit to Ogdensburg to see King. While Roosevelt and King chatted over drinks, the train moved out of Ogdensburg to Heuvelton, a quiet village nearby. About 8:00 p.m. the initial conference broke up, and Roosevelt asked Stimson and King to join him for dinner⁹¹

Roosevelt initiated dinner conversation by describing the destroyers-for-bases negotiations with Britain and listing the places within the British Empire where Americans would establish naval and air bases. Mentioning the matter of Canada, Roosevelt said that since Canada was a Dominion, "negotiation must be with Canada." FDR proposed establishing a naval and air base somewhere in the St. Lawrence region or along the northeastern coast. Specifically he mentioned some place like Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, or an area further eastward along the coast of that province. King, however, made it plain to Roosevelt that Canada did not wish to sell or lease sites, but would willingly work out means by which the United States could utilize facilities on Canadian territory. They decided that the U.S. would be allowed a limited free port where it might bring in supplies and equipment, and could install locks, drydocks, and repair shops. The Americans would not object to Canadian artillery defence of such bases, and furthermore, Canadian participation in base defence might protect against charges that the U.S. had violated Canadian sovereignty.⁹²

The President also proposed the immediate creation of a joint Canadian-American board, composed of an equal number of senior military men but led by two civilians, one from each country.⁹³ (There was an advantage, in fact, Roosevelt considered it politically necessary, to have a non-governmental civilian chairman when the United States was not a belligerent and Canada was.)⁹⁴ This agency would study mutual defence problems and submit recommendations to the two governments. The board's jurisdiction would be the northern half of the western hemisphere. Roosevelt commented to King that Newfoundland, because of its colonial status, constituted a phase of hemispheric defence on which the United States would have to negotiate directly with Winston Churchill. King concurred, but interjected that since Canada had undertaken the defence of Newfoundland, the British would probably want Canada to cooperate in negotiations. Roosevelt explained that the new board or committee should discuss plans for defence of North America, with attention to possible attack from the northeast. It seemed vital, Roosevelt said, that there should be conferences, discussions and plans between the armed services of the two nations in case an attack were launched up the St. Lawrence or along the northeastern coast of Canada. King was "perfectly delighted with the whole thing."⁹⁵

On Sunday morning, after attending a military service, Roosevelt and King returned to the train and Roosevelt proceeded to draft a joint press statement. Roosevelt, pencil in hand, read aloud the draft statement. It spoke of a permanent joint commission. King asked Roosevelt whether he thought the word "commission" was as good as "board" or "committee." The word "board," King pointed out, had been used the night before during conversation. Stimson agreed that "board" might be preferable and Roosevelt approved. King remarked that "commission" suggested the necessity of formal government appointments. "I then questioned him," King recorded later, "as to the significance of the use of the word 'permanent.'" Roosevelt answered immediately that he attached much importance to that word. King explained that he "was not questioning the wisdom of it but was anxious to get what he had in mind."⁹⁶ King, in fact, did not want to see the board dropped. He feared that in case the European situation brightened and Britain managed to stave off defeat, the United States might pull out of the agreement and abandon the board.⁹⁷ Roosevelt told King that the board should not be created "to meet alone this particular situation but help secure the continent for the future." King appeared pleased with this suggestion and readily concurred. Thereupon they agreed on the title, the "Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence."⁹⁸

The President commented a few days later to the newly-designated State Department Board appointee "that the defence of the United States and Canada was a permanent problem" and that "the Board ought to be a permanent body."⁹⁹ King also enthusiastically supported the proposal to establish a joint board to discuss problems because of his great affection for the International Joint Commission (IJC) and its success with boundary water issues. King reasoned that the PJBD, like the IJC, would continue to work after the war as a permanent body.¹⁰⁰

The two national leaders had two expectations of the PJBD: first, the recognition of an enduring geographic fact of life which was responsible for the addition of the word "Permanent"; and second, the short-term solution to the problem of providing a mechanism whereby two interdependent occupants of North America, one at peace, the other already a belligerent, could harmonize their activities without unacceptable liabilities in either country. "Permanent" provided a useful word for avoidance of such liabilities of the moment.¹⁰¹

Having agreed on a title for the Board, the President read the statement a second time, and King approved it. Its wording likewise satisfied Stimson,¹⁰² who remarked to others at the time that he felt the Ogdensburg Agreement marked a "turning point in the tide of the war, and that from now on we could hope for better things."¹⁰³ At noon, King and Roosevelt parted. King's aide handed copies of the joint statement to several newspapermen who stood nearby. The press release read:

The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defence in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States. It has been agreed that a permanent joint board on defence shall be set up at once by the two countries. This permanent joint board on defence shall commence immediate studies relating to sea, land and air problems including personnel and material. It will consider in the broad sense the defence of the north half of the western hemisphere. The permanent joint board on defence will consist of four or five members from each country, most of them from the services. It will meet shortly.¹⁰⁴

Diplomatically, the Ogdensburg Agreement contained a broad application. The United States government in effect announced to Germany: "Canada is at war with you; under the rules of war you are entitled to retaliate against her, but we are telling you that you must not retaliate against her in the homeland, which is North America."¹⁰⁵ This was sound American policy; the Ogdensburg Agreement both furnished a solution to the urgent demands for cooperation in hemispheric defence and, like the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal and Lend Lease, constituted American intervention in the European conflict. Further, it assured Canadians that the United States would not stand by idly if their country were attacked.

Evidence concerning Roosevelt's base facilities negotiations with Canada and Britain¹⁰⁶ rips a hole in the 1939 curtain to show that the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal and the Ogdensburg Agreement were more like delayed action responses than impulsive acts of empathy and desperation in a crisis. Scholars, however, generally agree that the Ogdensburg Agreement marked a turning point in American relations with Canada.¹⁰⁷ Certainly King viewed it as a momentous event. This new agreement, he affirmed in Parliament, was not to be of a temporary nature: "It is part of the enduring foundation of a new world order, based on friendship and good will."¹⁰⁸ In less flattering terms one Canadian critic described Ogdensburg with some slight exaggeration as marking a shift "from Canada as a British dominion to Canada as an American protectorate."¹⁰⁹ Yet one cannot but agree with the remark that so grim was the situation that many Canadians would have been willing to "pay the price", even if they had been able to "look into the future and see Ogdensburg as a turning point in the growth of American influences on Canada."¹¹⁰

Politicians have to make decisions based upon known alternatives at the moment. It was well-known in Ottawa during the summer of 1940 that Canada's element of choice might at any moment become narrow indeed. Keenleyside summed up the dilemma facing Canada quite succinctly in June when he advised King that "it may be that by taking the initiative along certain lines now we can hope to achieve a more satisfactory ultimate position vis-a-vis the United States than we can obtain by waiting until events force us to take the best available conditions in a time of crisis."¹¹¹ Assuredly, as former Canadian diplomat John Holmes once commented, the shift in power to the United States was not something the Canadian government desired; rather, "it was a fact to which Canada had to adjust."¹¹²

Furthermore, it appears evident that FDR, from the beginning of his presidency, linked Canada's future security with that of the United States. He intended the Monroe Doctrine to include Canada. He suggested as much at Chautauqua and defined that commitment more explicitly at Kingston. If necessary, he was prepared to act unilaterally, even in Canada, to protect American security. At Kingston Roosevelt outlined what might best be described as the "Canadian Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. It signaled the beginning of a new American policy, notwithstanding Roosevelt's protestations to the contrary. Given the traditional American opposition to foreign entanglement, Roosevelt cleverly calculated that his pledge to Canada would gain more ready acceptance if attached to an old time-honoured principle.

In fact, the 1938 Kingston Declaration and the Woodbridge acknowledgement marked the real turning point in Canadian-American relations. Those pronouncements were subsequently institutionalized in the PJBD. As Roger Swanson has observed, apart from the North Atlantic Treaty, there has been "no single formal agreement defining reciprocal expectations and obligations" between the United States and Canada; indeed, "the most definitive and comprehensive pledge of bilateral defense commitments remains that of the Roosevelt-King state-

ments of 1938." Swanson, however, tended to deprecate the later agreement with the comment that "the August 1940 Ogdensburg Declaration, regarded as the genesis of the contemporary defense relationship, was not a declaration but a six-sentence unsigned press release issued by King and Roosevelt."¹¹³ But the Ogdensburg Declaration (or Agreement) and the PJBD which it established counted for more than that.

The PJBD provided Canada and the United States with "a symbol" as well as an agency for joint study of defence problems,¹¹⁴ for with its creation the two governments recognized officially and for the first time the necessity for a joint and permanent approach to North American defence. Roosevelt and King agreed that only through the closest cooperation could the defence of both countries be guaranteed. In case of hostile attack, Canada could not defend herself alone, and the United States could not be defended without also defending Canada. The two leaders therefore formed a "Permanent" Joint Board which would meet the immediate wartime emergency and continue to function during peacetime. They saw little prospect that the international situation would ever return to the isolationism of the interwar period. That Board, as it turned out, furnished a forum well adapted to deal with problems which arose in the Canadian-American wartime *entente*. As former Canadian Board member R. A. MacKay recalled twenty years later, the Ogdensburg Agreement "was not an equal partnership, but it was remarkably free, due to the United States' restraint in declining to use its great military strength as a support for diplomacy vis-a-vis Canada."¹¹⁵

NOTES

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1. Tom Kent, "The Changing Place of Canada," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXV (July 1957), 583.

2. Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York, 1979), 88-89.

3. Joseph P. Lash, *Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939-1941: The Partnership That Saved The West* (New York, 1976), 39-51. Lash traces FDR's interest in the navy back to the President's boyhood.

4. Ross T. McIntire, *Surgeon General of the Navy: White House Physician* (New York, 1946), 118.

5. Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Address at Chautauqua, New York," August 14, 1936, in Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*. Volume V: *The People Approve, 1936* (New York, 1938), 286-292.

6. F. H. Soward, et al., *Canada in World Affairs: The Pre-War Years* (Toronto, 1941), 107; John B. Brebner, *North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of*

Canada, The United States and Great Britain (Toronto, 1966), 320.

7. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, I, November 12, 1940, 55 (hereafter cited as *Debates*); Roger F. Swanson (ed.), *Canadian-American Summit Diplomacy, 1923-1973: Selected Speeches and Documents* (Toronto, 1975), 39.

8. James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament* (Toronto, 1976), 179.

9. *Debates*, I, November 12, 1940, 55; Eayrs, *Appeasement and Rearmament*, 179-182; C. P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945* (Ottawa, 1970), 96-97.

10. C. P. Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-1945," *International Journal*, IX No. 2 (1954), 108-109.

11. *Debates*, III, March 30, 1939, 2420; I, November 12, 1940, 55-56; and Swanson (ed.), *Summit Diplomacy*, 53.

12. Roosevelt inserted the promise by his own hand in a draft speech prepared by the State Department. Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New

- York, 1948), I, 587-588, cited in S. W. Dziuban, *The Military Relations between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945* ("United States Army in World War II, Special Studies," Washington, 1959), 4.
13. Alexander De Conde, "On Twentieth Century Isolationism," in De Conde (ed.), *Isolationism and Neutrality: Ideals and Interests in Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy* (Durham, N.C., 1957), 1-2.
14. Robert Osgood, *Ideals and Self Interest in American Foreign Policy: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century* (Chicago, 1953), 17-19.
15. L. H. Laing, "Does the Monroe Doctrine Cover Canada," *American Journal of International Law*, XXXII (October 1938), 794, cited in W. H. Shepardson, et al., *The United States in World Affairs: An Account of American Foreign Relations, 1938* (New York, 1940), 219; *Memorandum on the Kingston Declaration*, MG 26 J4, Vol. 206, File 1969, King Papers, National Archives of Canada (NAC).
16. Shepardson, et al., *The United States in World Affairs*, 219. James Monroe could hardly have contemplated protecting British North America against aggression in 1823.
17. FDR to Tweedsmuir, August 31, 1938, PPF, 3396, Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library, quoted in R. D. Cuff and J. L. Granatstein, *Canadian-American Relations in Wartime: From the Great War to the Cold War* (Toronto, 1975), 95.
18. *Debates*, III, March 30, 1939, 2420.
19. King Diary, August 20, 1938, quoted in Eayrs, *Appeasement and Rearmament*, 183-184.
20. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 98.
21. Letter from S. L. Holmes, Office of the United Kingdom High Commissioner, Ottawa, to N. E. Archer, Dominions Office, December 19, 1938; C. W. Dixon, D. O. to J. Balfour, F. O. January 11, 1939, Foreign Office 371-22821 (A300/300/45), Public Record Office (PRO), London; and "Notes on Staff Talks held in 1938 between officers of United States and Canadian Defence Forces," RG25/D1, Vol. 779, File 381, External Affairs, NAC.
22. H. B. Neatby, *William Lyon Mackenzie King 1932-1939: The Prism of Unity* (Toronto, 1976), 295.
23. *Debates*, I, November 12, 1940, 56.
24. *New York Times*, November 16, 1938, cited in Dziuban, *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada*, 4; Stetson Conn, "Changing Concepts of National Defence in the United States, 1937-1947," *Military Affairs*, XXVIII (Spring, 1964), 2-3.
25. King Diary, November 15, 1938, quoted in J. L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945* (Toronto, 1975), 115.
26. *Life*, October 31, 1938, 11-13; *The Ramparts We Watch* (New York, 1938), ix, ii, 139, 145-148, and 156-158; see also Foreign Office Minutes by G. H. Thompson, November 15, and John Balfour, November 16, 1938, F.O. 371-21527 (A8433/64/45), PRO.
27. Admiral William Leahy, "Diary 1938 and 1939," Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., February 9, 1938, (Hereafter cited as Leahy Diary).
28. *Ibid.*, January 16, 17 and April 26, 1939. Leahy attended a lecture Eliot gave in Washington, January 16, 1939 on national defence and commented that Eliot demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the navy and sea defence, and appeared convinced that adequate naval defence was essential to American safety. The following day Eliot called at Leahy's office.
29. *Ibid.*, August 30, 1938. Roosevelt decided on this action in consultation with Admiral Leahy.
30. Cable message from Sir Ronald Lindsay to The Foreign Office, June 30, 1939, F.O. 371-23901 (W10081/9805/49), PRO; FDR to George VI, January 18, 1939, in Elliot Roosevelt (ed.), *FDR, His Personal Letters, 1928-1945* (New York, 1950), II, 854; FDR to Mrs. James Roosevelt, February 21, 1939, in *FDR, His Personal Letters*, II, 859; Leahy Diary, February 16 and 18, 1939.
31. Leahy Diary, March 23, 1939.
32. Some of the areas under consideration in addition to British Empire island possessions were British Honduras; British, French and Dutch Guiana; Greenland; and French and Dutch possessions in the Leeward and Windward Islands. Memo from W. A. Moffett, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics to the Chief of Naval Operations, March 1, 1933, R.G. 80, General Records of the Navy Department, Office of the Secretary, Secret Correspondence 1927-1929, File A-16, Box 218, National Archives (NA), Washington.

33. The list included the Falkland Islands; Makin Island in the Gilberts; Bougainville Island in the Solomans; a part of Australian Territory of New Guinea; and the Admiralty Islands in the Bismark Archipelago, an Australian mandate. Leahy to Sumner Welles, March 24, 1939, R.G. 59, General Records of the Department of State, File 811. 34500/3-1/4, Diplomatic Branch, Civil Archives Division, NA. (Hereafter cited as D/S File).
34. King George VI to FDR September 5, 1940, PSF, Diplomatic, Box 49, Great Britain, King and Queen, 1938-1942, Roosevelt Papers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York (FDR Library); William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, The World Crisis of 1937-1940 and American Foreign Policy* (2 vols., London, 1964), 208; and John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *King George VI, His Life and Reign* (London, 1958), 388-392.
35. Mackenzie King to Roosevelt, July 1, 1939, PSF, Diplomatic, Box 49; Great Britain, King and Queen, 1938-1942, Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library, and Mackenzie King Diary, June 10, 11, 1939, 675-684, MG 26, J13, NAC (hereafter cited as King Diary).
36. Roosevelt to George VI, May 1, 1940; George VI to Roosevelt, June 22, 1940, PSF, Diplomatic, Box 49, Great Britain, King and Queen, 1938-1942, Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library; and Neatby, *William Lyon Mackenzie King*, 313.
37. King Diary, June 10, 1939, 677-678.
38. Wheeler-Bennett, *King George VI*, 391-392. The King briefed Winston Churchill on the matter when he got home. Memo, Churchill to Director of Plans, V. H. Danckwerts, September 7, 1939, Admiralty 116/3922, X/M 04695, 255, PRO. It is not clear when the briefing took place but Churchill said, The King spoke to me about the plan of President Roosevelt's to control a 500 mile area east of the United States shore, and mentioned Bermuda and Trinidad as bases for fuelling which the American Fleet might require."
39. Benjamin D. Rhodes, "The British Royal Visit of 1939 and the 'Psychological Approach to the United States,'" *Diplomatic History*, II, No. 2 (1979), 211.
40. Cable message from Sir Ronald Lindsay to the Foreign Office, June 30, 1939, F.O. 371-23901 (W10081/9805/49), PRO. Lindsay found Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles, and Admiral Leahy, assembled in the President's Office when he arrived to confer with FDR
41. It is obvious that Roosevelt understood the significance of the 1931 Statute of Westminster as far as Canadian autonomy was concerned but his staff as late as mid-1940 still was thinking of the British Empire as a whole and had little appreciation either of Canada's political or strategic situation. C. D. Howe, Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply, remarked that in a recent conversation he had that summer with Henry Morgenthau, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary told him the President had said that he had recently put his Staff "over the jumps regarding Halifax." O. D. Skelton, Memorandum, Meeting of Cabinet War Committee, Vol. II, July-October, 1940, RG, 2, 7C, NAC.
42. Lindsay to F.O., June 30, 1939, F.O. 371-23901 (W10081/9805/49), PRO.
43. Lindsay to F.O., July 7, 1939, F.O. 371-23902 (W10361/9805/49), PRO; James R Leutze, *Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration, 1937-1941* (Chapel Hill. N.C., 1977), 42[^]5.
44. F.O. to Lindsay, July 6, 1939, F.O. 371-23901 (W10091/9805/49); F.O. Minutes by E. Fitzmaurice, H. W. Malkin and J. Balfour, July 10, 1939, F.O. 371-23902 (W10365/9805/49); Admiralty Minute by V. H. Danckwerts, Director of Plans, July 10, 1939, and approved by Earl Stanhope, First Lord, July 13, 1939, ADM/116/3922 (X/M 04695); Letter from J. Coulson, F.O. to Sir H. Moore, C.O., July 12, 1939; Letter Coulson, F. O. to Danckwerts, Admiralty, July 13, 1939; and Colonial Secretary to Governors of Trinidad, Bermuda, and the Officer Administering the Government of the Windward Islands, July 14, 1939, F.O. 371-23902 (W10655/9805/49), PRO.
45. Lindsay to F.O., July 8, 1939, F.O. 371-23902 (W10364/9805/49), PRO.
46. J. C Coulson, F.O. to C. W. Dixon, D.O., July 7, 1939, F.O. 371-23901 (W10081/9805/49), PRO.
47. Telegram from D.O. to the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Ottawa, July 15, 1939, F.O. 371-23902 (W10654/9805/49), PRO.
48. King Diary, July 19, 1939, 797.
49. R D. Cuff and J. L. Granatstein, *Canadian-American Relations in Wartime*, 112.

50. Daniel C. Roper, U. S. Minister, Ottawa, to Mackenzie King, August 3, 1939; Loring C. Christie, Canadian Minister, Washington, to O.D. Skelton, September 27, 1939, MG 26 J1 Vols. 277 and 265, King Papers, NAC.
51. Beatrice Bishop Berle and Travis Beal Jacobs (eds.), *Navigating the Rapids 1918-1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle* (New York, 1973), 241; Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History 1929-1969* (New York, 1973), 69-87; Other accounts of the Pact are contained in Norman Rich, *Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, The Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion* (New York, 1973), 127-128; and Christopher Thorne, *The Approach of War, 1938-1939* (London, 1967), 170-175.
52. Admiral H.R Stark, Acting Secretary of the Navy to Cordell Hull, August 24, 1939, D/S File, 811.345003-3/4, NA; Memorandum, Stark to the President, August 24, 1939, PSF, Navy Department, Box 78, Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library; Lindsay to the Governor of Bermuda, August 25, 1939, F.O. 371-23904 (W12476/9805/49); Governor of Bermuda to Colonial Secretary, August 26, and 28, 1939, F.O. 371-22837 (A5902/6061/45); Governor of Bermuda to Colonial Secretary, August 29 and September 7, 1939, F.O. 371-22837 (A5902/6061/45) and (A6855/6061/45); Lindsay to Governor of Windward Islands, and repeated to F. O, August 25, 1939, F.O. 371-23904 (W12473/9805/49); Acting Governor of Windward Islands to Colonial Secretary, September 13, 1939, F.O. 371-22837 (A8491/6061/45); Officer Administering the Government of Windward Islands to Colonial Secretary, August 28, 1939, F.O. 371-22837 (A5902/606M5); Memorandum from the Department of the Navy, Office of Judge Advocate General, Washington, D.C. to Colonial Office, September 18, 1939 and Letter from Lt. Commander John W. Harris, Navy Department, Bureau of Aeronautics to M.J.W. MacGillivray, Director of Lands and Surveys and Sub-Intendant, The Red House, Port of Spain, Trinidad, September 19, 1939; Letter from Hubert Young, Governor of Trinidad to Colonial Secretary, October 5, 1939; Letter from John W. Harris to M.J. W. MacGillivray, September 19, F.O. 371-22837 (A8237/6061/45), PRO. Most of the United States records concerning the leases are in RG 80, General Records of the Navy Department, Office of the Secretary, Secret Correspondence, 1927-1939 (DD/11-3 to EF73) Box 254, File EF 13, Navy and Old Army Branch, Military Archives Division, NA.
53. Memo from Bruce Hutchinson to Mackenzie King, June 12, 1940; M. M. Mahoney to O.D. Skelton, June 14, 1940, MG 26 J4, Vol. 400, Files 73 and 75, King Papers, NAC.
54. O.D. Skelton, "WW II: Canada's War Effort," August 24, 1939, MG26, J4, Vol. 228, File 2188, King Papers; and King Diary, August 25, 1939, 907, NAC.
55. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 99.
56. Roger Frank Swanson, *Intergovernmental Perspectives on the Canada-U.S. Relationship* (New York, 1978), 200.
57. King Diary, September 1, 1939, 940.
58. J.W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record. Volume 1, 1939-1944* (Toronto, 1960), 106-115; Granatstein, *Canada's War*, 116-118; C.P. Stacey, *Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle* (Toronto, 1976), 54-55; Eayrs, *Appeasement and Rearmament*, 191-194.
59. C.P. Stacey, "Turning Point: Canadian-American Relations During the Roosevelt-King Era," *Canada: An Historical Magazine*, 1, No. 1 (1973), 2.
60. Memorandum from Stanley Woodward, Assistant Chief, Division of Protocol to Brigadier General Edwin Watson, Presidential Aide, April 13, 1940, PPF, File 3089, Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library.
61. Granatstein, *Canada's War*, 118.
62. Pickersgill, *7M? Mackenzie King Record*, 106-108.
63. Henry Morgenthau, President Roosevelt, Personal Diary, April 29, 1940, Book 2, 47M72, FDR Library. Morgenthau kept a secret diary of his days with Roosevelt.
64. Stacey, *Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle*, 55.
65. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, 114-115.
66. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 328.
67. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, 116.
68. *Ibid.*, 116-117; Memorandum from Hugh L. Keenleyside for the Prime Minister, Report of A Discussion of Possible Eventualities, MG 26 J4, Vol. 400, File 75, King Papers, NAC, published in David

R. Murray (ed.), *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, VIII, Part II: 1939-1941 (Ottawa, 1976), 69-70.

69. Telegram from Mackenzie King to the Governor of Newfoundland, June 14, 1940, MG 26, J4, Vol. 396, File 2188, King Papers, NAC; Minutes of a Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, Ottawa, June 14, 1940, in Paul Bridle (ed.), *Documents on Relations between Canada and Newfoundland. I: 1935-1949* (Ottawa, 1974), 81-82; David MacKenzie, *Inside the Atlantic Triangle: Canada and the Entrance of Newfoundland into Confederation, 1939-1949* (Toronto, 1986), 22-39; Peter Neary, *Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 1929-1949* (Kingston and Montreal, 1988), 128-132.

70. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 332.

71. Nancy H. Hooker (ed.), *Jay Pierrepont Moffat, The Moffat Papers: Selections From the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 1919-1943* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 312-314; and Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, 124-125.

72. Memo from Bruce Hutchison to Mackenzie King "Absolutely Secret", June 12, 1940, MG 26 J4, Vol. 400, File 73; Memo from M. M. Mahoney, Canadian Legation, Washington to O.D. Skelton, June 14, 1940; and Memo O. D. Skelton to King, June 16, 1940, Vol. 400, File 75, King Papers, NAC. Hutchison was unable to recall who it was he interviewed in the U.S. Intelligence Service. He said in a letter, March 11, 1979 that, after all, these events happened "a long time ago." Dr. James Hewes, who has written the United States Army's official history of Administration, stated that there were at most two or three officers in G-2 at this point in time. The Head of Intelligence (G-2 himself) was Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles. There is also the likelihood that an outsider might confuse the War Plans Division (WPD) with the Intelligence Division (G-2) or assume that one was officially linked to the other. An outsider might conclude that the head of WPD was Number Two in G-2. This is an intriguing possibility because the Head of WPD, Brig. Gen. George V. Strong (WPD 16 Oct. 1938-14 Dec. 1940) subsequently became G-2. The number two man might have been one of the promising young officers who passed through G-2 or WPD during this period. The list included Dwight D. Eisenhower, Matthew B. Ridgeway and Omar Bradley.

73. Memo of a conversation between Bruce Hutchison and Key Pitman, June 13, 1940; and memo from

O. D. Skelton to King, June 16, 1940, MG 26 J4, Vol. 405, File 94, and Vol. 400, File 75, King Papers, NAC. Hutchison also had interviews with Adolf Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, and Moffat while he was in Washington.

74. Hugh L. Keenleyside, "An Outline Synopsis for a Reconsideration of Canadian External Policy with Particular Reference to the United States of America," June 17, 1940, RG 25 D-1, Vol. 68, File 394 (IV-250-A), External Affairs, NAC.

75. Hooker (ed.), *The Moffat Papers*, 314-315; Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 332-333.

76. Dziuban, *The Military Relations Between the United States and Canada*, 17; Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 332-336; Eayrs, *Appeasement and Rearmament*, 204-206.

77. Dziuban, *The Military Relations Between the United States and Canada*, 18.

78. Confidential Memorandum from Loring Christie to the Prime Minister, March 22, 1939, MG 30 E15, Vol. 23, Subject Files, File 89, Christie Papers, NAC.

79. Henry Morgenthau Diary, July 18, 1940, Book 284, 92, Morgenthau Papers, FDR Library.

80. Extract from Memorandum by Prime Minister, Kingsmere, July 13, 1940, King Papers, NAC, in *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, VIII Part II, 109-110.

81. Letter, United Kingdom High Commissioner in Ottawa to King, July 13, 1940 and Letter O. D. Skelton to United Kingdom High Commissioner July 16, 1940, MG 26 J4, 401, File 77, King Papers, NAC, in *ibid.*, VIII, Part II, 110-111.

82. Memorandum, FDR to General Edwin Watson and Dewey Long, August 3, 1940, FDR Official File 200-RRRR President's Trip, Inspection Tour, August 16, 1940, Roosevelt Papers, FDR Library.

83. Interview, Leolyn Dana Wilgress, August 13, 1963. Wilgress served as Chairman of the Canadian Section of the PJBD from August 1959 to June 1967.

84. J.P. Moffat to Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles, August 14, 1940, in *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1940* (Washington, 1958), III, 144-145, cited in Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 337.

85. Telegram, Loring Christie to King, August 15, 1940, King Papers, NAC, in *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, VIII, Part II, 126-127.
86. Loring Christie to O. D. Skelton, August 16, 1940, King Papers, NAC, in *ibid.*, VIII, Part II, 129.
87. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 338.
88. Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963, cited in D.P. Beatty, The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Michigan State University, 1969), 8. Dziuban, in his *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada*, 21, surmised that it was King who suggested a meeting with Roosevelt. Hugh L. Keenleyside agreed in 'The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-1945,' *International Journal*, XVI (1960), 51; Stacey noted, however, that the evidence is lacking for that conclusion; *Arms, Men and Governments*, 337.
89. Pickersgill, 77K; *Mackenzie King Record*, 130-131. On the question of Anglo-American diplomacy and defence relations during this period, see David Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982); John Baylis, *Anglo-American Defense Relations, 1939-1984* (2nd ed., New York, 1984); William R Rock, *Chamberlain and Roosevelt: British Foreign Policy and the United States, 1937-1940* (Columbus, Ohio, 1988).
90. Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963 in Beatty, The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence," 13.
91. Pickersgill, 77K; *Mackenzie King Record*, 131; Hooker (ed.), *The Moffat Papers*, 324-326; *New York Times*, August 17, 18, 19, 1940; *Toronto Globe and Mail*, August 19, 1940.
92. Pickersgill, 77K; *Mackenzie King Record*, 135; Hooker (ed.), 77K- *Moffat Papers*, 329-330; Henry L. Stimson Diary, in Dziuban, *The Military Relations Between the United States and Canada*, 23-24; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, 77K *Western Hemisphere: The Framework of Hemispheric Defense* ("United States Army in World War II," Washington, D.C., 1960), I, 372. C. G. Power, Minister for Defence for Air went to St. John's on August 17 to confer with officials on defence of Gander airport. He said while he was there that "so far as Canada was concerned no question of transfer to the United States of sovereign rights over any part of that country would be considered. The right to use Canadian military facilities would be accorded if sought, as also the right to erect on Canadian soil facilities, but the soil would remain Canadian and all sovereign rights and powers over it." Minutes of a meeting held at Government House, August 20, 1940, MG 26 J4, Vol. 1. 384, File 9, King Papers, NAC.
93. Stimson Diary, in Dziuban, *The Military Relations Between the United States and Canada*, 23-24; Conn and Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, 372; Langer and Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation*, 704-705; Telegram from Mackenzie King to Winston Churchill, August 18, 1940, in *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, VIII, Part II, 135-137.
94. Letter, J. Graham Parsons, October 15, 1963, in Beatty, The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense," 15. Parsons was an American State Department member on the Board from November 1945 to February 1947.
95. Stimson Diary, in Dziuban, 77K; *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada*, 23-24; Conn and Fairchild, 77K; *Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, 372; Langer and Gleason, 77K- *Challenge to Isolation*, 704-705; Telegram from Mackenzie King to Winston Churchill, August 18, 1940, in *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, VIII, Part II, 135-137; and Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, 131-132.
96. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, 133-134.
97. Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963, in Beatty, The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence," 19.
98. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, 134; and Letter, John D. Hickerson, October 24, 1963, in Beatty, The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence," 20. Hickerson served as State Department member on the Board during World War II. Dziuban, in 77K; *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada*, 25-26, concluded that King suggested the Joint Board should be designated as a permanent body. Hickerson refuted that in his letter cited above.
99. Letter, Hickerson, October 24, 1963, in Beatty, The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence," 20.

100. Interview, A. D. P. Heeney, June 9, 1967, in *ibid.*, 21. Heeney became Chairman of the Canadian Section in 1967 and served until 1971.
101. Letter, Parsons, October 15, 1963, in *ibid.*, 22-23.
102. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, 134.
103. Quoted from Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1947), 358-359, in Conn and Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, 372.
104. *New York Times*, August 19, 1940; *Toronto Globe and Mail*, August 19, 1940; *Congressional Record*, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940), LXXXVI, 12056; *Debates*, I, November 12, 1940, 54; *Department of State Bulletin*, III, No. 61 (1940), 154; and *Canada Treaty Series* (1940), No. 14.
105. Letter, Hickerson, October 24, 1963, in Beatty, *The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense*, 43.
106. The United States, in spite of the Navy Department's haste in leasing sites in August 1939, did not build bases on the leased territories partially because the struggle with Congress for amendment of the Neutrality Act made Roosevelt extremely chary of attempting anything which could be interpreted by his opponents as an entanglement of America with the War in Europe, and because the Navy Department was short of flying boats for the naval patrol. In practice the navy was able to organize the Atlantic patrol without use of British or Canadian territory. In fact the United States government had taken no steps a year later, when the Destroyers-for-Bases negotiations were under discussion, to utilize, terminate, or renew the island leases. Lord Lothian, British Ambassador in Washington to the Foreign Office, July 12, 1940; Colonial Secretary to the Governors of Trinidad, Windward Islands, and Bermuda, June 3, 1940; Governor of the Windward Islands to the Colonial Secretary, June 3, 1940; Governor of Trinidad to the Colonial Secretary, June 8, 1940; Governor of Bermuda to the Colonial Secretary, June 4, 1940, F.O. 371-24255 (A3297/2961/45), PRO.
107. Granatstein, *Canada's War*, 129 and 132; Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 339; Eayrs, *Appeasement and Rearmament*, 208; Conn and Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, 372; Dziuban, *The Military Relations Between the United States and Canada*, 28-30; Langer and Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation*, 705; Erik B. Wang, "Sovereignty and Canada-U.S. Cooperation in North American Defence," in R. St. J. MacDonald, *et al.* (eds.), *Canadian Perspectives on International Law and Organization* (Toronto, 1974), 864.
108. Mackenzie King's Report to Parliament on the Ogdensburg meeting was delivered on November 12, 1940. *Debates*, I (1940), 54-59.
109. J. L. Granatstein, "Getting on With the Americans," in Cuff and Granatstein, *Canadian-American Relations in Wartime*, 101.
110. Stacey, *Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle*, 51-52.
111. Hugh L. Keenleyside, "An Outline Synopsis for a Reconsideration of Canadian External Policy with Particular Reference to the United States of America," June 17, 1940, RG 25 D-1, Vol. 68, File 394 (IV-250-A), External Affairs, NAC.
112. John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957* (Toronto, 1979), I, 138.
113. Swanson, *Intergovernmental Perspectives on the Canadian-U.S. Relationship*, 200. The press release which established the PJBD was variously referred to in Canada as the Ogdensburg Agreement, and in the United States as the Ogdensburg Declaration.
114. Letter, Ronald W. MacDonnell, September 3, 1963, in Beatty, *The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense*, 23. MacDonnell served as External Affairs member on the Board from September 1945 to February 1947, and from October 1955 to January 1958.
115. Interview, R. A. MacKay, August 15, 1963. MacKay was External Affairs member on the Board from January 1951 to October 1955.

17 "The Geography of the Monroe Doctrine and the Limits of the Western Hemisphere," *Geographical Review*, July, 1940, p. 525.

18 Iceland: The First American Republic (1939). 19 Cf. President Wilson's phrase in his speech of Jan. 22, 1917: "The doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world." Recommend this journal. Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection. Although the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was essentially passive (it asked that Europeans not increase their influence or recolonize any part of the Western Hemisphere), by the 20th century a more confident United States was willing to take on the role of regional policeman. In the early 1900s Roosevelt grew concerned that a crisis between Venezuela and its creditors could spark an invasion of that nation by European powers. The Roosevelt Corollary of December 1904 stated that the United States would intervene as a last resort to ensure that other nations in the Western Hemisphere fulfilled their The Roosevelt Corollary, outlined in Theodore Roosevelt's 1904 State of the Union address and expanded upon in his 1905 address to Congress as an amendment to the Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed a new interventionist doctrine for American foreign policy in the western hemisphere. In effect, the corollary stated the United States' right to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of any sovereign state in the western hemisphere if it conflicted with American interests in the region. Roosevelt also asserted the right of the United States to resist European imperial ambitions in Central and South America.

The Ogdensburg Agreement was an agreement concluded between Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in Heuvelton near Ogdensburg, New York on August 17, 1940.[1] It outlined a permanent plan for mutual defense overseas between the United States and Canada and established the Permanent Joint Board of Defense. By July 1940, Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, along with a growing number of Canadians, was becoming increasingly concerned that Britain would fall and that Canada, with its small population and abundant natural resources, would become Germany's next target. Monroe Doctrine, U.S. foreign policy enunciated by President James Monroe in 1823 that the U.S. would not interfere in European affairs and wars or with existing colonies in the Western Hemisphere. European intervention in the hemisphere (closed to future colonization) would be seen as a hostile act against the U.S. Although initially a hands-off approach to foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine and the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary, which supplemented it laid the groundwork for U.S. expansionist and interventionist practices in the decades to come. United States: An age of reform. Read more about U.S. expansionism. What were the basic tenets of the Monroe Doctrine?